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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The atrocities of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 
Rwanda in 1994 were, and continue to be handled by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR).1 This Tribunal is expected to be substituted by another organ 
known as International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) after the 
completion of its activities.2 The prosecution of those crimes is not only conducted by 
international courts but it is also a duty of domestic courts whether Rwandan courts or 
those of any other country, members of the United Nations.  This is done in accordance 
with the principle of concurrent jurisdiction provided for by article 8(1) of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute. Article 8(1) states that: 
‘The International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda and national Courts shall have 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda  and Rwandan  citizens for such 
violations committed in the territory  of the neighbouring states  between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994.’3 
 
The principle of concurrent jurisdiction applies to various international tribunals; among 
of them the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the main focus of this thesis, the ICTR.4   
The principle of concurrent jurisdiction is observed where two or more courts from 
different legal systems simultaneously have the jurisdiction to entertain a specific case.5 
                                                 
1 See the United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the ICTR, S.C. res. 955, 49 U.N. 
2 Resolution No s/res/1966 (2010) of the UN Security council establishing residual mechanism to 
conclude tasks of ICTR and ICTY, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc10141.doc.htm 
[Accessed on 16 February 2013]. 
3  See the article 8 of the ICTR Statute and article 5 of the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism 
for Criminal Tribunals. 
4 While Ad hoc International Tribunals apply the principle of primacy over national courts the ICC applies 
the principle of complementarity. 
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In international criminal law, the application of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction 
necessitates the existence of two types of Courts: a national court and an international 
one. As a result of the uniqueness of the Rwandan context, there were more courts 
hearing matters that arose from the genocide.6 In Rwanda, such cases are tried by 
‘conventional courts’ and the ‘Gacaca’ courts. Gacaca is defined as a system of 
transitional participative community justice, whereby the population is given the chance 
to speak about the committed atrocities, to prosecute, defend, judge and punish the 
criminals. 7 The conventional courts are divided into ordinary courts and military courts. 
All these courts have the jurisdiction to prosecute genocide cases. Genocide cases were 
therefore heard in three different courts domestically but in concurrence with ICTR. As 
a result of the particular context of the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, particular issues 
arise and will be explored in this study.  
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
This dissertation seeks to explore the connection between Rwandan conventional 
courts and the Gacaca courts on one hand. It also seeks to analyse the relationship 
between domestic courts (local or foreign) and the ICTR. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
5 Robert Cryer, Hakam Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elisabeth Wilmshurst An introduction to 
international Criminal law and procedure, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, New York (2010) at 
46. 
6 See the various legislation regulating the organization, functioning and competence of courts. Starting 
with the supreme law which is the Constitution of Republic of Rwanda, in Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Rwanda Special number of 4th June 2003.  See also the Organic Law N°08/96 of 30/08/1996 on the 
organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity 
committed since 1 October 1990 in Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda Nº17 of 1/9/1996. See also 
the Organic Law No 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up Gacaca jurisdictions and organizing prosecutions 
for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed between October1, 
1990 and December 31, 1994. In Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda No 06 of 15 March 2001. 
These legislations illustrate how the crime of genocide was handled by 2 sorts of courts beside the ICTR. 
7 Conventional courts in the judicial system of Rwanda encompass those courts and tribunals belonging to 
the formal judicial system contrary to Gacaca courts which combine the nature of formal courts and 
restorative justice system. See also Cecile Aptel The oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, 
Oxford University Press, New York (Ed) (2009) at 330.  
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Furthermore, seeing as the Gacaca courts have already been wound up, and the ICTR is 
now nearing completion, this research aims to illustrate also how the issues left by these 
two Courts can be handled. A proper attention will be paid especially for the case of 
ICTR whereby   the residual mechanism established to continue the work of the ICTR is 
also ad hoc.8  The legal issues to be analysed in this study are of two categories: 
Criminal justice and Human Rights. This paper will analyse the juxtaposition of Rwanda 
as the country where the crimes were committed and other countries having jurisdiction 
over such crimes. Furthermore, the matters intrinsic to the particular context of Rwanda 
will be examined. 
The Gacaca system has been chastised for violating human rights standards, for 
example the violations of procedural rights of the accused.9  The response by the 
Rwandan government has been that any possible human rights violations in Gacaca 
courts are justified by the necessity of providing a legal process for a good number of 
incarcerated genocide suspects; who apart from that would not have gone through the 
process.10 This study focused on looking at the legitimacy such human rights exceptions 
seen in Gacaca process to satisfy that no right has been violated under the pretext of the 
particular circumstances surrounding the process of Gacaca.  
This dissertation will focus on three main points:  
i. To examine the relationship between the ICTR and national courts under 
the concurrent jurisdiction.  
ii. To demonstrate that as a consequence of applying the principle of 
concurrent jurisdiction, the solutions proposed for the so called ‘residual 
issues’ to be addressed by the ICTR appear to be taken hurriedly and 
need to be reassessed in the interest of justice.  
                                                 
8See the resolution s/res/1966.  It stipulate in its preamble that, the MICT ‘shall be a small, temporary and 
efficient body ‘with the task to continue the essential functions of ICTR and ICTY. This implies that the 
residual mechanism will also have an end.  
9 Amnesty International Report, December 2002(AI index AFR 47/007/2002) at 35 para VII (2) (a): 
Minimum fair trial standards and Gacaca Jurisdictions. 
10 National service of Gacaca jurisdictions (2008), Gacaca courts process: implementation and 
achievements. Kigali, available online at 




iii. The internal situation in Rwanda and the question around what 
advantages and disadvantages the country has gained from Gacaca and 
the weight afforded to them.  
The study asserts that Gacaca has been a success so far in terms of fast tracking cases 
and contributing to national healing and reconciliation. However, the concerns around 
human right violations attached to Gacaca courts cannot be ignored or taken lightly. 
1.3.  Delimitation of the Study 
 
This dissertation is limited to the analysis of issues arising from the principle of 
concurrent jurisdiction concerning the crime of genocide only. This thesis does not 
engage with all the international crimes within the jurisdiction of ICTR, Rwandan and 
third countries Courts. It simply focuses on the crime of genocide and the role played by 
the Gacaca courts to try principally this crime.  
 
1.4. Relevance of the Study 
 
The fact is that the ICTR is preparing to close and Gacaca courts have long 
closed their operations. Initially, for the ICTR, the Security Council have decided that 
the Tribunal shall complete its investigations by the end of 2004, trials at first instance 
by December 2008 and appeal proceedings by December 2010. These deadlines were 
not met as planned and the year 2014 has been announced as the year of closure.11  To 
ensure that those procedures are resonating and project what will occur in the future; a 
comprehensible conception of the situation is required. This study aspires to provide 
such insight.  
                                                 
11 SC Res 1534, 26 March 2004. These deadlines have not been met and another proposed date to close 
officially has been set for 2014 in December. See the statement of the spokesperson of ICTR Roland 




The application of the articles 25-27 of the ICTR statute was a referral point for 
national courts concerning the enforcement of sentences, pardon, the commutation of 
sentences and the review of proceedings in the context of closing the ICTR. It is 
interesting to consider how all these tasks will unfold in the context of ICTR post 
closure. Presently, as the ICTR is winding up, it is the opportune time to think of how 
procedures laid out in the statute should be exercised. This is in order to recognize, in 
advance, the potential pitfalls so that the transitional necessary measures can be taken 
into consideration in a timely manner.  
 
1.5. Objectives of the Study 
 
The objective of this research is to highlight the legal issues arising from the 
principle of concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of genocide in Rwanda. It also seeks 
to determine the legal effects of the completion of the ICTR relating to the concurrent 
jurisdiction it has with other domestic courts. This study will make hopefully, 
meaningful recommendations which should help to address the issues related to the 
relationship between ordinary courts and Gacaca courts within Rwanda and it questions 
the validity justifying human rights violations committed in the Gacaca courts. 
 
1.6.   Methodology of the Study 
 
This study is a desktop based. It draws mainly on the legal analysis of 
international criminal law by assessing various international instruments and domestic 
legislation. These instruments and legislation are read in conjunction with the domestic 
and international case. It also investigates and examines academic literature on the 
subject matter. The sources of this thesis includes  journal articles, books, legal 
briefings, the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), reports and 
other closely linked references available online.  
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1.7. The structure of the dissertation 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters. This introduction is chapter one of the thesis 
and presents the dissertation and its focal points. It provides a brief overview, sets out 
the problem statement, the justification for the study, research questions, and the scope 
of the study, the significance and structure of the study.  
Chapter two discusses the background and a theoretical overview of the principle 
of concurrent jurisdiction in general, the scope, rationale and the implications of this 
principle in practice.  
Chapter three considers the legal issues that arise from the application of the 
principle of concurrent jurisdiction that are common to Rwanda and other countries.  
The fourth chapter then narrows the focus to exploring the legal issues that are 
specific to the Rwandan legal system. The relationship between Rwandan formal courts 
and Gacaca Courts will be covered in this chapter. Unlike this relationship, the link 
between Gacaca and ICTR is not really pertinent to be covered because Gacaca as a tool 
to try genocide is also concerned by the same principles governing national courts in 
terms of concurrent competence. 
The fifth and final chapter consists of the summary of the study and outlines the 











CHAPTER 2:  GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
CONCURRENT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
2.1.   Introduction  
 
When creating the ICTR, the Security Council took a decision to confer the 
tribunal with what was known as ‘concurrent jurisdiction’.12 This conferring of 
concurrent jurisdiction was combined with the ‘primacy’ clause.13 This was done to 
clarify the relationship between national and international jurisdiction.  
Article 8 of the ICTR Statute recognizes the principle of concurrent jurisdiction 
as between the ICTR and the domestic courts.14 This signifies that national courts also 
have jurisdiction over the crimes investigated by the international criminal tribunal for 
Rwanda. The concurrent jurisdiction has meant that, an international court may waive its 
jurisdiction and allow for the national courts to prosecute the accused. This principle 
implies also that two or more courts have jurisdiction over the same case. Such 
situations are characterized by equal competence accorded to several courts and 
tribunals.15  These are the place of commission of the offence, the place of arrest of the 
accused, the state of nationality of the accused or the victim and also on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction.16 
This chapter gives a general review of the principle of concurrent domestic and 
international jurisdiction with regard to international crimes. The analysis of the 
principle revolves around four essential sections dealing with the notions, the scope and 
                                                 
12 Brownlie I Principles of Public International Law 4th edition, (Clarendon Press 1995) at 317. 
13  Article 8 § 2 of the ICTR Statute. 
14 See art 9 §1 of ICTY Statute and artart8 §1of ICTR. 




the rationale of the principle, the primacy of the ad hoc tribunals (ICTR) over national 
courts and the practical implications of the principle.  
 
2.2.   Concurrent jurisdictions 
2.2.1. Notions 
The creation of the ad hoc international tribunals does not induce substitution of 
domestic courts, but a competing jurisdiction. There is concurrent jurisdiction when two 
or more courts declare themselves competent for the same facts. Such considerations are 
based on the sovereign equality of all states.17 This occurs when the alleged perpetrator 
is found within or outside a state’s territory or whether the perpetrator and the victim are 
nationals of another country. 
In the context of Rwanda, the Statute of the ICTR recognize concurrent 
jurisdiction between the International Tribunal and national courts.18Therefore any 
national court has jurisdiction to prosecute alleged offenders. 
These national courts have the jurisdiction to try case on the following basis: 
i. the territoriality principle19,  
ii. the principle of personality (active or passive)20, 
iii. the principle of protection also called the principle of reality,21and   
iv. The principle of universal jurisdiction.22  
 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 See art8 §1of the ICTR statute. 
19 See the case of S.S Lotus (France vs Turkey), publications of the PCIJ Series A. No. 10, 7th September, 
1927. Para 71-84. 
20 See U.S. v. Yunis (1991) 30 ILM 403, see also Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ Rep., 
1955, p. 4, available online at http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights 
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/internationalcases/internationalcourt/nr/1925 [Consulted on 
23/05/2014]. 
21 See  Attorney- General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, (1961) 36 ILR 5; available in Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law. 
22 For more details see the case of Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 Case (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), Decision of the ICJ, 2002.  
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2.2.2.  Practical implications of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction 
 
This section will examine the principles governing the national criminal 
jurisdiction and the rationale and the scope of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction. 
 
2.2.2.1.Principles governing national criminal jurisdiction 
 
By principles governing the criminal jurisdiction of a State wishing to prosecute 
crimes under international law, this dissertation refers to cases where national 
jurisdictions deal with the international criminal responsibility of an individual based on 
the criteria of the criminal jurisdiction of their respective State. 
These principles refer to the jurisdiction of a State in connection to all offences 
committed in their territories and those committed extraterritorially.23 Indeed, even if the 
offence has an international character, it is usually committed in the territory of a given 
State against the victims of such state or a citizen of a particular State. Similarly, if by 
principle the offence is international because it violates the essential interests of the 
international community as a whole; it is, above all, the interests of a particular State that 
are violated. The traditional criminal jurisdiction of a state also applies in matters 
involving international crimes.24  
Under the principle of territoriality, it is the State on whose territory an 
international offence was committed that has jurisdiction. Specifically, the State of 
Rwanda and its neighbouring countries are competent to punish international crimes 
committed on their territories during the Rwandan genocide. In the famous Lotus case, 
when the collision occurred between the two French and Turkish vessels in August 
1926, Turkey had tried and convicted the French Lieutenant Demons and the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, accepting the jurisdiction of the Turkish court in 1927 
                                                 
23 O’Keefe R ‘Universal jurisdiction, clarifying the basic concepts’ Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 2 (2004) at 738-739. 
24 Antonio Cassese op cit at 284. 
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stated that: ‘All we can ask a State is not to exceed the limits which international law 
places upon its jurisdiction; below its limits, the title of the exercise of jurisdiction rests 
in its sovereignty’.25 This means literally that a State may exercise this type of 
jurisdiction except if there is a principle of international law prohibiting the exercise of 
the same jurisdiction. The exercise of this jurisdiction is among the uncontroversial basis 
of jurisdiction; however the consequences of absolute territoriality would be unfortunate, 
that is why States also exert extra territorial criminal jurisdiction.26 This is what happens 
when a State has its own nationals as perpetrators or victims.   
 
Under the principle of personality for example, France may try crimes committed 
by some of its military in Rwanda during the genocide and Burundi may initiate 
proceedings against its nationals who could be alleged perpetrators of genocide in 
Rwanda.27 This is done on the basis of the active personality principle. The active 
personality principle applies when a state has the authority to criminalize conduct 
performed on its soil, as well as a conduct performed abroad by its nationals. 
 
             Similarly, when Belgium pursues Rwandans accused of murdering Belgian 
soldiers during the genocide, such action is based on passive personality jurisdiction. 
Passive personality jurisdiction addresses the conduct of non-nationals whereby the 
victims of that conduct are nationals of a State prescribed to that jurisdiction.28 
 
The protective principle is an extra territorial jurisdiction, through which a State 
exercises its criminal authority over offences committed outside of its territory. The 
offences committed in such a situation are deemed to produce a threat to the national 
                                                 
25 See S.S Lotus (France vs Turkey), publications of the PCIJ Series A. No. 10, 7th September, 1927  at 
124. 
26 O’Keefe op cit 23. 
27 In this respect, Rwanda used to maintain discretionary   a list of Burundians who have  been involved in 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda if  this list is published, Burundi may choose to prosecute itself without 
extradite them to Rwanda.   
28 O’Keefe op cit 23. 
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interest of that particular country.29 In the case opposing United States v Zehe, the 
United States District Court of Massachusetts held that it has jurisdiction on the basis of 
the protective principle because the espionage acts by Zehe causes threats on its national 
security30. This principle provides a State with jurisdiction as soon as one of its vital 
interests such as when its sovereignty, security or important governmental functions are 
threatened.31  
 
Finally, some States exercise the criminal jurisdiction on the basis of universality 
where there is absence of any other available prescriptive jurisdiction connection.32 
According to the principle of universality, a State asserts its jurisdiction without any 
criterion of direct connection with the offence except possibility in the presence of the 
author on its territory.33  The principle of universality gives jurisdiction to the courts of 
the State in whose territory the offender is arrested or is even located temporarily to 
continue to try, regardless of the place of commission of the offence or nationality of the 
perpetrator or victim.34 The rationale for this is grounded in an argument that, if national 
courts were based solely on the principles of territoriality alone many gaps would remain 
and that would have unjust consequences. This is why States are also using universal 
jurisdiction. In this perspective, the Indictment Division of Paris confirmed the 
jurisdiction of the French Court for crimes against humanity and genocide committed in 
Rwanda in the Munyeshyaka case.35 Again in the case of A.G. of Israel v Eichmann, 
whereby the main issue was to know if Israel has the jurisdiction to try Eichmann crimes 
when it had none of the jurisdictional links to his offence. The Court held that ‘the 
universal character of the crimes’ in issue gives rise to Universal jurisdiction, even if 
there is no nexus between the forum State, the conduct, the offender or victims.36 The 
reasoning is that a State can invoke the universality principle when it comes to 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985). 
31Robert Cryer at al op cit at 47. 
32 Cryer op cit at 45. 
33 Ibid. 
34Cryer op cit at 47. 
35 International federation of human rights league available online at http://www.fidh.org/  [Accessed on 
25 January 2014]. 
36 See Attorney- General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, (1961) 36 ILR 5. 
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international crimes that threaten the interests of the international community and thus 
that State acts on behalf of the later. 
 
          The principle of universality gives States jurisdiction of a universal nature. 
However, the principle somewhat violates the principle of the sovereign equality of 
nations which is a fundamental principle under international law. The State is sovereign 
within its territory when its jurisdiction is exclusive and absolute. Acts carried out by a 
State should enjoy an irrefutable presumption of validity. Thus enable the foreign Court 
‘to challenge’ the validity of decisions of the State constitutes ‘unjustifiable interference 
in the internal affairs of such a state’.37  But because of the limitations due to the 
necessary coexistences with other States as subjects of international law, the 
independence of the State is no way compromised or its sovereignty affected by the 
existence of international obligations of the State. Indeed, sovereignty does not mean 
that the State can break the rules of international law.38 This is even true that a State has 
a repressive power that would normally regard affairs of another state. Therefore, the 
principal of universal jurisdiction is an exception to the normal rules of international law 
and only applies to the most serious crimes of international law.  
 
Concerning the competing jurisdiction with international courts, the case law 
available on this matter comes from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). This is a tribunal similar with the ICTR in terms of make-up and 
workings. In the Celebici case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that ‘there is no 
hierarchical relationship’ between the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and an 
International Tribunal and that there is no legal basis justifying that the ‘ad hoc Tribunal 
can defer in favour of the ICJ and, therefore, is bound by the decisions of the latter’.39  
 
                                                 
37 Kelsen H., Sovereignty and international law, in the Georgetown Law Journal, vol 48(1960) at 627. 
38 Ibid. 
39 ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-96-21-A, Prosecutor v Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and 
Esad Landzo, called ‘Case Celebici’ Judgment of 20 February 2001, § 4. 
13 
 
Again in the Kvacka case,40 one of the defendants made a motion to suspend the 
proceedings before the ICTY arguing that a concurrent process was before the ICJ 
(Bosnia - Herzegovina v Yugoslavia).41 The  Trial Chamber  dismissed the claim on the 
grounds that ‘… the ICJ, the main judicial organ of the UN, deals with States 
responsibility, while the tribunal, established by the Security Council on the basis of the 
chapter VII of the UN Charter, deals with individual criminal responsibility.’  
 
On 25 May 2001, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the finding of the trial 
chamber  noting, among other things, that: ‘… no legal basis exists for suggesting that 
the international tribunal must defer to the International Court of Justice such that the 
former would be legally bound by decisions of the latter’ .42 This signifies that there is 
no rule which provides that the international tribunal must defer to the International 
Court of Justice as the first should be bound by the decisions of the later but the reverse 
is impossible. 
 
With regard to regional international courts, there is no issue of competing 
jurisdiction with ad hoc tribunals that have been noticed.43 As for the ICC, the issue of 
concurrent jurisdiction with ad hoc tribunals does not arise because the ICC only has 
jurisdiction, in general, with respect to crimes committed after the date of its entry into 
force, which is from 2002. 
 
As explained previously (see page 8), the ICTR and domestic courts both has 
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide committed in Rwanda. The exercise of such 
                                                 
40 ICTY Trial Chamber I, in Kvacka Case No. IT-98-30/1. Decision on the Defence Motion Regarding 
concurrent proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and ICJ on 
the same questions, 5 December 2000. 
41 Bosnia- Herzegovina had seized the ICJ by a request from the March 20, 1993 against Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) to recognize the violation by the latter, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but also the four Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter, besides 
other provisions of general and customary international law. 
42 ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case Kvacka, No. IT-98-30/1- AR 73 , 5 , Interlocutory Appeal of Decision by 
the accused Zoran Zigic against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 5 December 2000. 
43 Adjovi  Roland  and Dellamorte Gabriel  Le procès équitable devant les tribunaux pénaux 
internationaux (2012) at 8. 
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jurisdiction by one of those courts may cause a kind of competition of jurisdiction when 
it comes to each of them wanting to assert jurisdiction on the same matter. From that 
situation of competition between national courts and ad hoc tribunals in exercising 
jurisdiction it may results an unfortunate conflicts of jurisdiction. That is why the 
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals have, however, provided a remedy which will be 
examined in the following section. 
 
2.2.2.2.The rationale and the scope of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction. 
 
The establishment of the principle of concurrent jurisdictions in the statute of the 
ICTR has been inspired inter alia by the following elements. 
First, it was apparent from the beginning that the ICTR would not be able to 
prosecute all the cases before it in the short time of its mandate.  As of 1997, the 
Rwanda’s prisons were overcrowded with up to 90 000 inmates, all waiting for 
prosecutions.44 The ICTR could not manage to finalise all these cases in a reasonable 
time.45 In these circumstances the adoption of concurrent jurisdiction principle was a 
good option.  This was also because genocide was an international crime of which States 
could exercise their jurisdiction. This refers to prerogatives States have to assert their 
jurisdiction. Thus, the establishment of an international Tribunal could not deprive 
national courts of the competence they previously had on that crime. Therefore, it was 
necessary to allow them to do so and not deprive them of their judicial powers based on 
the ratification of the Genocide Convention empowering them to assert jurisdiction over 
this crime. 
Secondly, as highlighted by Cassese, the ICTR does not hold any territory or 
prison where its sentences should be carried out. Unlike domestic criminal courts, 
international tribunals do not have enforcement agencies. Without a link between the 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Morris M .H, ‘The trial of concurrent jurisdiction: the case of Rwanda’ Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law, vol.7, (1997) at 357. 
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ICTR and national authorities, the ICTR cannot perform some of the activities to 
achieve its goals. For example, it would be near impossible to acquire evidence, compel 
witness to give testimony, search the scenes where crimes have allegedly been 
committed, or to execute arrest warrants.46  On this basis, international courts must 
establish ways to cooperate with State authorities to provide them with the necessary 
support to investigate.47 
 
This is what the drafters of the ad hoc tribunals statutes emphasized on. The 
statute was aimed to give assurance that the purpose of the tribunals was not to replace 
national judicial systems but that the tribunals would collaborate in the pursuit of the 
same goals.48  The question is therefore whether cooperation between the tribunal and 
the domestic courts exists and what it looks like.  
 
2.2.3. Principles of Concurrence and primacy of jurisdiction  
 
2.2.3.1. The primacy principle   
 
From the jurisdiction over the crime of genocide recognised to both the ICTR 
and domestic, it may originate the jurisdictional conflict. In the situation whereby the 
two collided on the same case, the conflict to know which takes precedence over the 
other is resolved by the ICTR statute. This section, analyses the primacy of ad hoc 
tribunals over domestic courts and the relationship with each other. In our case, the 
ICTR will have primacy over national courts of every country asserting the same 
jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 





The primacy principle originates from the fact that the tribunal was created by 
the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.49 Article 8 of the ICTR Statute 
stipulates that national courts and the ICTR have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute 
persons who fall within the scope of covered crimes. The competing jurisdiction has the 
consequence that the ICTR may waive its jurisdiction and allow priority to a national 
court.50 The primacy of ICTR and ad hoc tribunals, in general, tampers with competing 
jurisdiction. The ICTR statute states that ‘the International Tribunal shall have primacy 
over national Courts’.51 Clearly, the ICTR and domestic courts does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction but for ICTR, it may ‘at any stage of the procedure formally request national 
courts to defer to its jurisdiction’ in accordance with its Statute and its Rules of 
Procedure and evidence.52  
In fact, the ad hoc tribunals and ICTR in particular, do not have exclusive power 
to try alleged perpetrators but they may require national courts to handover the case to 
their jurisdiction. The primacy seems best suited to ensure impartiality of the court. 
Impartiality is an inherent condition to the idea of justice.53 Clearly, this principle is a 
direct consequence of the mode of creation of the two ad hoc tribunals. Both courts were 
established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to help ensure peace and 
security. The maintenance of peace and security is the primary mission of the UNSC. 
Therefore, they have the same binding effect as any of the Security Council's decisions 
taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter .54 This was the grounds in Tadic case where 
the Appeals Chamber issued a landmark judgment.  In this case the five judges 
unanimously upheld the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Chamber held that the decision of 
the Security Council to establish the Tribunal was a legitimate action under the UN 
Charter aimed to contribute to peace and security.55 
                                                 
49 Morris Virginia and Michael P Scarf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda volume 1, 
transnational publishers, Inc. (1998) at 99. 
50  Morris Virginia & Michael P Scarf  op cit at 315.   
51  Article 8 § 2 of ICTR Statute. 
52 Articles 9 § 2 and 8 § 2 of ICTY and ICTR Statutes. 
53 See Morris Virginia and Michael P Scarf op cit at 316. 
54 Virginia and Scarf at 97. 
55 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion 
on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Para 47. 
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2.2.3.2.The meaning of the principle of primacy 
 
The principle of primacy of the ad hoc tribunals means that the fact that domestic 
law does not punish an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not 
relieve the person who commits such a crime of any responsibility.56 The relationship 
between the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and national courts is defined by the 
Statutes in terms of the primacy of the international tribunals and the existence of 
concurrent jurisdiction between the tribunals and the national courts.57 The two, thus 
have a ‘concurrent jurisdiction’ with national jurisdictions.58 
 The concurrent jurisdiction principle implies that crimes covered by the statutes 
of the two ad hoc tribunals can be prosecuted both domestically and by the ad hoc 
international tribunals.  
As part of this ‘concurrent jurisdiction’, the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals have primacy over the national courts.59  Indeed, Article 8 of the ICTR Statute 
provides: 
‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed 
in the territory of the neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994.’ 
 
Article 8 § 2 goes on to state that: ‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall 
have primacy over national courts …’ 
From the foregoing three consequences can be derived from the principle of 
primacy: 
i.  The authority of res judicata by the international tribunal which is binding on the 
courts of all states.60 
                                                 
56 Virginia and Scarf at 312.   
57 Ibid. 
58 Article 9, § 1 of ICTY Statute and art8, § 1 of the ICTR Statute. 
59 Articles 9 § 2 and 8 § 2 of ICTY and ICTR Statutes. 
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ii. At any stage of the procedure, the international tribunal may ask national 
authorities to defer to its jurisdiction.61  
iii. The transfer of suspect criminals before the ad hoc international tribunals. 
Note, for all intents and purposes, the national courts may prosecute the 
perpetrators of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals if the latter do not intervene to impose their primacy. Thus, the judgments 
rendered by the State courts are endowed with the authority of res judicata before the ad 
hoc tribunals, except in cases where the prosecution would prove as a qualification of 
ordinary offenses.    
 
2.2.3.3. Legal basis of the primacy principle 
 
Article 25 of the UN Charter states that ‘members of the United Nations agree 
and accept to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter’. In its advisory opinion on 21 June 1971 on the ‘Legal consequences for 
States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council, the ICJ stated that Article 25 of 
the UN Charter is not limited to decisions regarding enforcement action but applies ‘to 
the decisions of the Security Council’ adopted in accordance with the Charter. Also the 
question as to whether article 25 applied only to decisions of the UNSC on coercive 
measures under articles 41 and 42 in Chapter VII of the Charter would render article 25 
superfluous.62 
From the above, it could be deduced that only decisions of UNSC taken under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding. However, by passing resolutions 808 (1993) 
and 955 (1994) creating ad hoc tribunals, the UNSC has always justified the creation of 
the tribunals and their jurisdiction as acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. These 
                                                                                                                                                
60  See Article 10 of ICTY and art 9 of the ICTR Statutes. 
61 Article10 RPE common to the two ad hoc tribunals; see also art9 § 2 of the ICTY statute and art8 § 2 of 
the ICTR statute. 
62 See ICJ Reports (1971) at 53 § 113. 
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resolutions are binding decisions. Accordingly, as the subsidiary bodies of the UNSC, ‘ 
the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals have the same binding force as any UNSC 
decisions’ taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.63  
 
However, if an ad hoc tribunal faces resistance from States that refuse to 
implement the decisions they have taken, their only recourse is to approach the UNSC 
for it to use his political power to persuade or coerce recalcitrant States.64 This is exactly 
what Carla Del Ponte; former Prosecutor of the ad hoc tribunals did in November 1999 
about Croatia and Bosnia when they showed reluctance to cooperate with the ICTY. 
 
In the situation of competition of jurisdiction, the International Criminal Tribunal 
takes precedence over national courts insofar as they may have jurisdictions to handle 
facts, but must defer to the International Tribunal if it request deference.65  
 
 
2.2.3.4. Primacy versus Complementarity 
 
To provide a comparison between the two concepts, it is interesting to analyse it 
in terms of the relationship between the international tribunals and the State’s criminal 
justice system. On the one hand, it is the relationship between the two systems expressed 
as concurrent jurisdiction or the primacy of the tribunal over the national court. On the 
other hand the relationship between these entities can be examined from a perspective of 
the principle of ‘complementarity’. 
The primacy of the ICTR over national courts arises from the principle of 
concurrent jurisdiction. The establishment of the principle of concurrence of national 
and international jurisdictions involve the issue of how to harmonize the relationship 
                                                 
63Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial chamber, decision on the defense motion: jurisdiction of 
the tribunal, 10 august 1995 at para 11. 
64 See the amicus curiae statement of the United States, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T of 25 
July 1995, at 2-3. 
65 See the ICTR Statute, art 8 § 2 and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Art 9-12). 
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between international tribunals and national courts. As national courts and international 
tribunal both share jurisdiction to pronounce on the crime of genocide, it is important to 
know which forum takes precedence.66  
 
To circumvent any confusion between primacy and the notion of 
complementarity, it might be useful to provide an example through our understanding of 
the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. In the situation of the ad hoc tribunals, primacy has 
been granted to them over national courts. At the ICC system, the situation is reversed 
and the primacy is given to the national courts, but under certain conditions.67  
 
Indeed, in the ICC context, the situation is referred to as complementarity instead 
of primacy.  Concerning the meaning of the principle of complementarity, Cassese 
argues that ‘the first responsibility comes to the national courts to act over the case, thus 
the ICC will step in to serve in the event where justice is inappropriately dispensed’.68 
The ICC will not be competent to assert its jurisdiction if the case is being investigated 
or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, or if the case has been 
investigated by the State which has jurisdiction over it.69 These were the grounds in 
Prosecutor v Al- Senussi; where the Trial Chamber upheld the complementarity on the 
basis of article 17 of the Rome Statute. The Chamber concluded that the case against the 
accused is inadmissible before the ICC due to the factors that it was being investigated 
domestically by Libya.70 According to the wording of this provision encapsulating the 
complementarity of the ICC, a case will be admissible at the ICC only if the State which 
has jurisdiction over it is ‘unwilling or unable’ to carry out investigations or 
prosecutions. Therefore, the domestic courts have a primary responsibility to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes. The ICC will only intervene if national courts fail to 
                                                 
66  Cassese A Guido Acquaviva et al, International Criminal Law, Cases and Commentary’ Oxford 
University Press (2011) at 523. 
67 Cassese op cit at 339. 
68 Cassese A Guido Acquaviva et al op cit 66. 
69  See Prosecutor v Al - Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Conf, , Decision on the admissibility of the case 
against Abdullah Al-Senussi, 11 October 2013. 
70 Sands P, From Nuremberg to The Hague, the future of the international justice(Ed) (2003) at 74-75. 
21 
 
do so. It is obvious, that this arrangement appear opposite to that of the situation of ad 
hoc tribunals. 
 
Coming back to the primacy recognized to both ad hoc tribunals, it has been 
challenged as violating domestic jurisdiction of States and their sovereignty.71 Those 
were the grounds in Tadic case, when his defence council challenged the primacy of the 
tribunal. In this case the tribunal held that the accused lacked the capacity to raise such 
issue of primacy involving a petition of State’s sovereignty violation.72 It held that, such 
a power only is to be exercised by the concerned State.73 It quashed the claim in the 
terms which clarify the logic of this primacy by confirming that, when an international 
tribunal such as the ICTY is created, ‘it must be given with primacy over national 
courts’.74   The reasons to assert the primacy are to avoid the passivity of States to 
prosecute due to their limited capacity or to intervene in situation of sham trials. 
 
 
2.2.4. Justification for the primacy principle 
 
On the one hand, the principle of primacy is justified by the rejection of impunity 
and, secondly, by seeking impartial justice. 
 
2.2.4.1.  The refusal of impunity 
 
The rejection of impunity justifies the principle of primacy of international 
criminal justice of both International Tribunals on the internal States justice. This theme 
                                                 
71 Prosecutor v Tadic, case IT -94-1-AR 72, decision on appeal jurisdiction, rendered by the appeal 
chamber on 2/10/1995, at para 41 - 55. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74  See the Prosecutor  v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1 Decision on the Defence motion for interlocutory Appeal 
on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paras 58-59, available online at www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Tadic: 
Appeals Chamber decisions. 
22 
 
of rejection of impunity is pervasive. International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development (ICHRDD)75, published a review in 1998 entitled ‘info - 
impunity’. In that publication, they bring together several articles relating to the 
genocide in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge, on how the UN addresses the issue of 
impunity.  They indicate that the particular condition of a true democracy in Cambodia 
is the use of authentic trials; they argue that justice is the only way to overcome hatred 
and ulterior motives on which it is not possible to build a sustainable peace.76  
 
Louise Arbour, former Chief Prosecutor of the ad hoc tribunals until 199977 was 
convinced of the usefulness of justice as a mean to restore lasting peace. She stated that 
‘[t]he Courts have not prevented the crime and the risk of punishment encourages the 
author to be more clever … the effect is not measurable because it is impossible to know 
what would have happened in Kosovo if ad hoc tribunals does not exist’.78  
On 26 February 1996 the President of the ICTY stated: 
 
‘No one would deny that peace in this region of Europe should be accompanied by 
justice. It is not enough to put an end to armed conflicts, repair destroyed buildings, to 
organize the return of refugees, it is not enough to restore order in the streets, it is still 
necessary to restore order in the mind.’79    
 
The first annual report of the ICTY to the General Assembly and UNSC stated 
that ‘the impunity of perpetrators’ would fuel the desire for revenge in the former 
Yugoslavia, making references to the return of ‘legality’, ‘reconciliation’ and 
‘restoration of peace worthy of its name.’80 Thus, the primacy of the ad hoc tribunals 
was necessary to make sure that the impunity which reigns in the history of Rwanda and 
                                                 
75 This centre is a non-governmental organization that advocates for the fight against crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. It describes itself agency of information on impunity. Headquartered in 
Montreal (Canada) as instructed online at http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article.php?id=942. [Accessed 05 
February 2014]. 
76See Virginia Morris op cit at 103. 
77 See the Resolutions of the UNSC: S/Rés.1047 (1996) appointing Louise Arbour as Prosecutor of the 
ICTR and ICTY. 
78 Semo Marie ‘All tracks’ in Libération of 29 January 1999, cited by Virginia Morris op cit at 111. 
79 See the statement of the president of the ICTY available online at   
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/16/2orentlicher.pdf [Accessed on 04 February 2014]. 
80 Annual Report of the ICTY to the GA and UNSC, A/49/342, S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994, § 11-16. 
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Yugoslavia be curbed The primacy in this sense enables the ad hoc tribunals to cure 
proceedings where domestic courts failed to try adequately perpetrators or to carry out 
justice. 
 
2.2.4.2. Seeking the impartial justice 
 
The primacy principle seems to be a best option to ensure impartiality.  When the 
protagonists in a conflict are given the task to resolve the conflict themselves in the 
country or countries affected by the conflict, it guarantees the continuation of the 
struggle by interposed litigations. And in this case, revenge takes over the justice.81 That 
is why the ICTY took a decision in regard with that issue.  
 
The ICTY has ruled on that in the Tadic case. Dusko Tadic was initially pursued 
but not prosecuted by the German authorities who forwarded the case to the ICTY. 
Tadic did not object to the transfer, probably because of the heavy charges against him 
in Germany including grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), 
violations of the laws and customs of war and crimes against humanity.82When he 
arrived in The Hague, he challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the ground that 
the rule of international jurisdiction over national courts violated the sovereignty of 
States. But this claim was rejected by both the trial chamber and the appeals chamber as 
mentioned earlier. It has highlighted in its reasoning that human nature being what it is, 
the primacy principle should apply when it comes to hearing international crimes.83 The 
application of this principle is of paramount importance to ensure that cases are dealt 
fairly and without bias. 
 
About impartiality of ad hoc tribunals, it is finally to note that the defence of the 
accused Joseph Kanyabashi challenged the primacy of the ICTR on domestic courts 
                                                 
81  See Virginia Morris op cit at   312. 
82 ICTY Trial chamber II, Tadic (1997), § 9 Journal of international Jurisprudence, at 1361. 
83  See Prosecutor v Tadic, supra. 
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arguing that it violates the principle of jus de non evocando. This principle states that 
some people retain the right to be tried by regular internal and criminal courts rather than 
by ad hoc tribunal because of their political nature, which in times of crisis may not be 
impartial.84  
 
Challenging this argument, the ICTR appeals Chamber held that the primacy 
principle aims to prevent the creation of special courts or extraordinary which tries 
political offences without the guarantees of a fair trial. It held that unlike the special 
courts, the international tribunal is neither ‘designed in order to remove the offenders to 
a fair and impartial justice or to be judged by prejudiced arbitrators’.85 It is important to 
note that the primacy is not always a justification of impartiality but it may apply in 
certain circumstances aimed to deal with cases judiciously as explained previously. 
 
2.2.5.    The effect of the principle of primacy 
 
The principle of primacy induces ipso facto the principle of ne bis in idem, the 
deferral of criminal cases and the transfer of the alleged perpetrators to national Courts, 
a consequence that flows from the principle of primacy and concurrent jurisdiction 
endowed to ICTR. In the next section, this dissertation analyses the principle of double 
jeopardy, while other effects will be discussed in chapter three. 
 
2.2.6.  The ‘ne bis in idem’ principle 
 
The principle of ne bis in idem holds that no one should be tried twice for the 
same offence. The principle is applicable both in domestic criminal law and international 
                                                 
84 See Prosecutor v Kanyabashi, case ICTR-96-15-T, Trial Chamber Decision on the defence motion on 
jurisdiction, 18 June 1997 at para 526. 
85See Prosecutor v Kanyabashi, case ICTR-96-15-T, Appeals Chamber Decision on the defence motion 
on jurisdiction, 18 June 1997 at para 526. 
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criminal law. This is a legal guarantee provided by the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.86  
 
The principle is again reiterated by ad hoc tribunal’s statutes.87 Under these 
provisions no person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law under the statute if he or she has already 
been tried for the same offence by an international tribunal.88 This principle is a 
fundamental element of fairness in criminal procedure. At its core, it prohibits States 
from repeatedly prosecuting, and punishing individuals for the same offence. 
 
                 The application of this principle at domestic level poses problems when it 
comes to its interpretation regarding whether it applies only to decisions of the same 
country or to those of different states. This is what occurred in the case of A.P v Italy.89 
In this case the factual situation was about the conviction of Italian citizen for same 
offence (money laundering) in two countries. The substantive issue in this case was the 
non bis in idem as set forth in article 14(7) of the ICCPR. This citizen claimed being a 
victim of violation of this provision of the covenant. The author was first convicted by a 
Switzerland court and sentenced for 2 years which he served and expelled from 
Switzerland afterwards. Arriving in Italy, the Italian government seeks to punish him for 
the same offence he had already convicted and served. Italian courts convicted him in 
the first instance and the appeal confirmed the conviction to four years of imprisonment 
and a fine. He referred the matter before the Human rights committee and invoked 
article 14(7) of ICCPR as being violated by Italy. He rejects that this provision applies 
only with regard to judicial verdict of the same country and not with regard to judicial 
decisions of different States. The Committee in deciding on the admissibility of this 
communication, it held that it was incompatible with the covenant, especially article 
14(7). The committee make it clear that this provision does not guarantee non bis in 
                                                 
86 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, art14 point 7. 
87 See article 9 of the ICTR statute. 
88 See respective statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals art 10 for ICTY and art 9 for ICTR. 
89 See A.P. v Italy, Communication No. 204/1986 rendered on 2 November 1987, Para 67. 
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idem with regard to the domestic courts of two or more states. It emphasizes that the 
provision in question prohibits double jeopardy only with regard to an offence tried in a 
given country. This case shows that very few States accept the application of this 
principle between them unless they have signed a bilateral agreement to that effect. This 
lack of trust between States on how criminal justice is administered in another States is 
not a good thing in terms of protection of individual rights.  
 
The application of the principle of non bis in idem before ad hoc tribunals is a bit 
different to the practice at domestic level where there is no rule of international law 
imposing the obligation to respect this principle between States. Before ad hoc tribunals, 
a person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of 
IHL may be subsequently tried by these tribunals.90 Conversely, the prosecution of a 
person tried by an international tribunal by domestic courts for the same offence is not 
possible. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the two ad hoc tribunals (hereafter 
RPE), endorse the principle relating to the primacy. Indeed, if the President receives 
reliable information of criminal proceedings against a person before a domestic court for 
an offence for which the person has already been tried by the international tribunal, the 
trial chamber takes an order in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 10, 
mutatis mutandis, requesting the court to discontinue its proceedings.91 The RPE adds 
that if the Court fails to do so, the President may refer the matter to the UNSC.92   
 
Moreover, article 12 of the RPE provides that decisions of the domestic courts 
are not binding before the international tribunal subject to article 10 paragraph 2 and 
article 9 paragraph 2 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. These provisions clarifies that the 
decisions of the ad hoc tribunals are stronger than those of national courts. Literally, it 
means that domestic courts cannot proceed with a case against the perpetrators of crimes 
falling in the competence of the ad hoc tribunals if they have already took a final verdict 
for the same crimes. This exception aims ‘to prevent a travesty of a trial before a 
                                                 
90 See articles 10 of ICTY and article 9 of ICTR Statute. 




complacent court not to impose the deserved punishment’.93 However, ad hoc tribunals 
can judge an alleged person who has already been tried by a national court if:94 
 
i. The act for which the accused was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; 
ii. The national court has not acted impartially or independently; 
iii. The proceedings before that court designed to shield the accused from 
international criminal responsibility; 
iv. The case was not diligently prosecuted.95     
 
Note, for all practical purposes, these conditions are not cumulative. It is 
sufficient that one condition is present for the international tribunal to take control of the 
case; this should be proved by the prosecutors of ad hoc tribunal.96  It is crucial to recall 
that there are no precedents involving international crimes which have produce a 
common standard regarding the application and the scope of this principle. 
 
In different circumstances, the defence counsel of the accused Nahimana, former 
director of Independent Radio Television of Mille Collines (RTLM) in Rwanda, argued 
that the cumulative of charges violated the principle of ne bis in idem. He argued that, in 
this case he was prosecuted several times for the same offence. Indeed, he believed that 
the principle applies not only in cases where a person is prosecuted in several 
jurisdictions for the same offence, but also when he is prosecuted several times for the 
same offence before the same court. The exception was rejected on the grounds that the 
question was relevant only for the determination of sentences.97 One can say that the 
defendant argument would have much sense if each charge against him could endorse its 
                                                 
93 Coffey Gerard, ‘Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings: Interpreting Ne Bis In 
Idem in Conjunction With the Principle of Complementarity’ Journal of European Criminal Law, vol. 4, 
issue 1–2, (2013) at 63. 
94 See art10 § 2 of ICTY and art 9 § 2 of ICTR Statutes. 
95 See article 8 (2) ICTY St. and art 9 (2) ICTR Statute. 
96 Coffey op cit at 63.  
97 See ICTR case of Ferdinand Nahimana, decision on the objection raised by the defense on procedural 




punishment but the rule of criminal law determines that the greater punishment absorbs 
the lesser when it comes to single act constituting various offences. Thus, this rule 




This chapter has provided the overview of the principle of concurrent domestic 
and international jurisdiction and has discussed its scope and rationale.  It has focused on 
the principle of primacy throughout the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals. The 
principles governing the national criminal jurisdiction have also been discussed in this 
chapter. Ultimately, it argued that, the ad hoc tribunals and national courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes committed in Rwanda. 
But the chapter has clarified that ad hoc tribunals continue to keep pre-eminence over 
national courts in asserting the primacy over the accused. This supremacy is a direct 
consequence of the principle of res judicata by an international tribunal and the 
possibility of deferral of national courts to the competence of ad hoc tribunal at any 















CHAPTER 3:   LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
3.1. Introduction 
The principle of concurrent jurisdiction implies two categories of relationships, 
each with its own set of problems. The first is the vertical relationship between national 
courts and the international tribunal and the second one is the horizontal relationship 
between different countries courts.98 In the horizontal relationship, particular attention 
will be paid to the relationship between the country where the crime has been committed 
and other countries on the possible basis of jurisdiction discussed in chapter two. This 
chapter discusses legal issues surrounding the concurrent jurisdiction between ICTR and 
the national courts, specifically those arising from the ICTR closure. The analysis will 
consider the transfer of cases to national courts. I will look at some decisions of the 
tribunal regarding the request of transfers and illustrates the kind of issues that the ICTR 
closure may generate in terms of enforcement of its judgements. I will refer to these 
issues, generally, as the ‘post-closure’ issues.   
 
As the ICTR statute does not provided the terms of its closure as an ad hoc 
tribunal with a limited lifespan, such situation has occasioned the need to consider how 
the transfer of cases can be one of the ways to close its activities.99 This chapter 
illustrates how the transfer requests of cases to national courts on the basis of concurrent 
jurisdiction create challenges. It deals with those concerns that arise from the principle 
of concurrent jurisdiction, however the analysis will focus on those that are specific to 
Rwanda and those issues shared with other countries where the genocide fugitives may 
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3.2.   Problems pertaining to the prosecution of genocide cases 
 
3.2.1. Concurrent jurisdiction of ICTR between the country of the commission of 
crimes and other countries 
 
The analysis of the situation of competing jurisdiction of different countries and 
the country where the crimes have been committed should be done taking into account 
the distinction between the two situations. There is the prosecution to be commenced by 
the country of the commission of crimes itself for one hand, and to the other hand the 
transfer of cases from ICTR to domestic courts. 
 
Concerning the first situation, practice has shown that most countries are 
reluctant to investigate and prosecute genocide suspects who reside in their countries.100  
The report of the Genocide Fugitives Tracking Unit (GFTU) shows that until 2013 only 
few foreign countries had prosecuted Rwandan genocide suspects at national level, these 
are Norway, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden and Canada.101 The motivation of 
these countries to do so are varied but could include the moral sentiment towards 
contributing to the universal justice and of the implications of the principle of ‘aut 
dedere aut judicare’ that obligates countries to either extradite or to punish.102Apart 
from the aforementioned justification, there is no other known palpable benefit or 
interest for a foreign country to prosecute such cases when there is a cost implication 
attached to those proceedings. 
                                                 
100 See the annual report of the National Public Prosecution Authority of Rwanda (2013) at 8.This report 
shows that only counties like Canada, Norway, France, Switzerland and Belgium have shown willingness 
to start investigations and extradition of the suspects where possible while others continue to be reluctant 
regardless of the indictments drawn and sent in different countries that shelter fugitives. 
101 Jennifer G Riddell ‘Addressing crimes against international law: Rwanda`s Gacaca in practice’ Thesis, 
university of Aberdeen (2005) at 26. 
102 Bassiouni C and Wise EM ‘Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute’ in 
International Law Boston/London (1995) at 3. 
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The above mentioned report highlights that there are still many genocide 
suspects living outside of Rwanda.  The ICTR continues with the daunting task finding a 
way to persuade countries who continue to shelter genocide suspects to become more 
active in prosecuting them. The United Nations should motivate member States to take 
their international law obligations seriously when it comes to gross violations of human 
rights by individuals. 
 
Regarding the transfer of ICTR cases to Rwanda, a substantial element and a 
consequence of the completion strategy of the ICTR, was specified at its creation by 
Resolution 955 as stated in the introduction of this chapter.103 It clearly shows that the 
continuance of the ICTR is not desired. The transfer of ICTR cases to national courts has 
become a relevant option to meet the deadlines given by UNSC in order to ensure a 
safest closure. The UNSC had asked the international community to assist national 
courts to strengthen their capacity to deal with cases transferred by the ICTR.104 Rwanda 
as the main country wishing to receive ICTR cases begun to adjust its national 
legislation to comply with international requirements. In 2007, Rwanda adopted law 
abolishing the death penalty and the Organic Law for referral to Rwanda by the ICTR 
cases and other states.105 
Recently Rwanda has been given priority over other countries that also have the 
ability to prosecute genocide cases. This is for the reason that justice is more seen to be 
rendered if genocide suspects are judged in Rwanda where the victims of their crimes 
are based. Another justification is the fact that Rwanda has worked incessantly to make 
sure that the conditions of eligibility have been improved.  This is not a compelling 
principle to favour transfer of cases to Rwanda over other countries as the Mechanism 
                                                 
103 Resolution 955. 
104 Ibid. 
105  See the Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25/7/2007 on the abolition of the death penalty, in official 
Gazette n ° special of 25/07/2007.  See also the Organic Law n ° 11/2007 of 16/03/2007 relating to the 
referral of cases from the ICTR to the Republic of Rwanda and other states, in Official Gazette n ° special 
of 19/03/2007.  
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for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) statute is clear in its article 6(1).106In 
addition to abolishing the death penalty, Rwanda has done its best to improve its judicial 
system. In 2004 Rwandan tribunals and courts recruited more experienced and qualified 
staff to reinforce its justice system.107 In the area of sentencing, a new prison,   
complying with the international standards required by United Nation was built and 
approved to satisfy all requirements.108   However, the capability of the Rwandan 
judicial system has been also questioned and acts as an obstacle to the transfer of cases 
from the ICTR to Rwanda. What was unusual during this process of requesting the 
transfer of cases is that the denial of certain transfer arises at the time all these 
improvements were unfolding.109 
 
3.2.2. Basis for the transfer   
It is important to recall that before 2002, in the statute of the ICTR, there was no 
provision regulating the transfer of case, until an amendment of the RPE was made.110 
This section discusses and analyses certain cases decided by the ICTR on the 
prosecutor’s request to transfer cases to national courts. It examines the reasons offered 
by the tribunal for refusal or granting the transfer request. Two cases emanating from a 
request by Rwanda and two cases of requests from other countries will be reviewed. 
 
                                                 
106 This provision stipulates that the Mechanism have the power to refer cases involving persons under its 
jurisdiction to the authorities of States. This implies that it may be any state not only Rwanda as a country 
where crimes have been committed. 
107 See the keynote address of the Chief justice of Rwanda on 28/02/2013 available online at 
http://www.qatarlawforum.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Rugege_Speech_Legal_Reforms_and_the_R
ule_of_Law_in_Rwanda.pdf [Accessed on 12/02/2014]. 
108 This is an international prison called Mpanga that has been constructed   in Nyanza District, Southern 
province of Rwanda. 
109The death penalty was abolished prior to the Rule 11 bis decisions. The ground for transfer refusal 
common to all decisions taken by ICTR was that there was legal ambiguity relating to the maximum 
sentence if it is life imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions (perpetual confinement). 
The court held that this could be an impediment for witnesses both inside Rwanda and abroad because 
they would be unwilling to testify in defence for fearing torture, harassment and other consequences. This 
has been confirmed in various decisions handed down by ICTR. See Prosecutor v Hategekimana para 22- 
38, Prosecutor v Munyakazi para 37 Prosecutor v Kanyarukiga para 26, Prosecutor v Gatete para 64 and 
Prosecutor v Kayishema para 40. 
110 See the amendment of the RPE made on the 16 July 2002 by the ICTR Judges. In this amendment Rule 
11 bis was legally adopted  to authorize transfer of cases.  
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Evidently, the sole fact that crimes have been committed on the Rwandan 
territory cannot serve as a sine qua non condition to justify the transfer of cases to 
Rwanda. There is a set of standards that is taken into account by the ICTR for example, 
the guarantee of a fair trial to the accused person and the compliance to the human rights 
requirements in general by the domestic criminal judicial system.111 The criteria for 
transfer of cases to national courts are set forth in Rule 11 bis of RPE which provides 
basis through which the Court must follow to refer cases. Thus, these criteria governing 
the referral of cases can be summarized in the principle that, ICTR chambers have to be 
convinced that the accused will be subjected to a fair trial, and not sentenced to death 
penalty if convicted.112 In this regard, the ICTR judges are given a new role by this rule 
(Rule 11bis (C)) i.e. deciding on issues outside of their scope in which international 
criminal law applies to assess whether a national system is capable to conduct a fair trial. 
 
Antonio Cassese highlights that ‘the availability of the death penalty and issues 
regarding the capacity and fairness of the domestic system appear to exclude the referral 
of cases to the national authorities in Rwanda’.113 Which means that concerned states are 
encouraged to meet the above requirements if they want cases to be transferred to them 
otherwise the request would be rejected. 
 
3.2.3. Case law and issues regarding competing jurisdictions seeking to prosecute 
transferred cases 
The case that marks the first trial to be decided on in relation to transfer of cases 
from ICTR to national courts is the case of Prosecutor v Michel Bagaragaza.114 The 
ICTR prosecutor in requesting this transfer, he found Norway as the suitable destination. 
                                                 
111 Cassese A The oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice Oxford University Press, New 
York (Ed) (2009) at 363. 
112 See RPE op cit at (C). 
113 Ibid.  
114 See Prosecutor v Michel Bagaragaza, case no. ICTR-2005-86.R 11 bis. 
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But the Trial Chamber III rejected the prosecutor's arguments to transfer this case to 
Norway due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.115  
 
While some incarcerated defendants were refused transfer to the national courts, 
in the case of Prosecutor v Laurent Bucyibaruta & Prosecutor v Wenceslas 
Munyeshyaka, the tribunal decided to transfer indictments of both accused to France.116  
The tribunal accepts to grant referral without complications contrary to the request made 
by the prosecutor for the cases involving Rwanda. Those cases whose transfer has been 
denied include the prosecutor requests to transfer various defendants like Munyakazi, 
Gaspard Kanyarukiga and Hategekimana Ildefonse to Rwanda, all rejected by Trial 
Chamber III of the ICTR.117  
 
In the case involving the transfer of Munyakazi, the Trial chamber advanced   
certain reasons to refuse the referral of the accused to Rwanda. Firstly, the trial chamber 
was not convinced that the accused person would be prosecuted by an independent court 
and that the accused would not be subjected to a fair trial. The court justification was 
based on the composition of the bench of judges in the legal system of Rwanda formed 
by a single judge.118 The court asserted that, conducts amounting international crimes 
the suspect was alleged having committed, should not be tried under the bench of a 
                                                 
115 Prosecutor v Michel Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR/98/44/AR11 bis (Appeals Chamber), Decision on 
Rule 11bis Appeal, 30 August, 2006, Para 16. 
116 Prosecutor v Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I (Trial Chamber), Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Request for Referral of the Indictment against Bucyibaruta to the French authorities, 20 November 2007. 
‘Ordered that the Prosecutor V. Bucyibaruta be referred to the French authorities, charging for them to 
seize immediately the competent court in their State’; Prosecutor v Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Case No. 
ICTR-2005-87-I, (Trial Chamber), decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Indictment 
against Wenceslas Munyeshyaka to the French authorities, 20 November 2007, ‘Orders that the case  
Prosecutor v Munyeshyaka be referred to the French authorities, to allow  them immediately to seize the 
competent court in their state.’ 
117 Prosecutor v Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR/97/36/11bis, (Trial Chamber), Decision on the prosecutor's 
request to refer the case to the Republic of Rwanda, 28 May 2008, para.67: ‘The chamber is not satisfied 
that the accused, if transferred to Rwanda at the time, would receive a fair trial’.  See also Prosecutor V. 
Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the prosecutor's request to refer the case to 
the Republic of Rwanda, 6 June 2008, par.104; see also Prosecutor v Ildelphonse Hategekimana, Case No. 
ICTR-00-55B-I (Trial Chamber), Decision on the prosecutor's request to refer the case to the Republic of 
Rwanda. 
118 Prosecutor v Munyakazi supra at para 40. 
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single judge and, doing so would be a peril of violation of the accused rights to be tried 
by an independent tribunal.119 
 
The second reason for the court in this case, was that the Trial Chamber was not 
convinced with the adequacy of the penalty structure in the Rwandan criminal law. It 
held that, the transfer cannot be granted in order to avoid that the sentence of life 
imprisonment in isolation be imposed on the accused person. This sentence was 
provided in place of the death penalty which was abolished and replaced. In the 
reasoning of the court, it believed that such punishment was applicable to the accused 
transferred from ICTR also.120A decision which was challenged by the prosecutor 
showing that the punishment of life imprisonment in isolation was not applicable to 
transferees, because they have their own special regime governing them which provided 
as maximum sentence the life imprisonment. However, the court quashed that argument 
and ruled that it was not satisfied that such kind of sentence would not be imposed to the 
accused. 
The last reason advanced by the Court in this case, was the issue of right to a fair 
trial of the accused. The Trial Chamber was not convinced that the accused would be 
able to secure attendance of witnesses and examine defence witnesses as easily as the 
prosecutor would. Thus the court ruled that the fair trial could not be promised in 
Rwanda.121  The outcome of this case at appeal was that, the Appeals Chamber 
concurred with the Trial Chamber’s decision on certain points such as the penalty 
structure and witness protection.122 The Appeals Chamber changed the impugned 
decision on the issue regarding the independence of the judiciary whereby it held that 
the fair trial is not determined by the existence of more than one judge.123 
 
                                                 
119 Prosecutor v Munyakazi supra at para 49. 
120Prosecutor v Munyakazi supra at para 32. 
121 Prosecutor v Munyakazi supra at para 66. 
122 Prosecutor v Yussufu Munyakazi Decision on the Prosecutor’ s Appeal Against Decision on Referral 
under Rule 11 bis (08th October 2008). 
123 Prosecutor v Yussufu Munyakazi, supra Para 26. 
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One can say that the common denominator tribunal reasoning of certain transfers 
being refused to Rwanda; was that the court was not satisfied that the accused persons 
will receive a fair trial and that the life imprisonment with isolation would not be 
applied.124 
 
The other case relating to a request by Rwanda is that of Prosecutor v Gatete 
Jean Baptiste.125 In this case, the Trial Chamber clarified as in other cases on referrals 
that its role in such case is to examine whether the destination State has a legal 
framework which criminalizes conduct the accused is alleged being committed, and also 
the adequacy of penalty structure.126 
 
Concerning the issue of a fair trial, the Trial chamber seemed to contradict its 
first considerations in the previous case, on whether this right would be ensured by 
Rwandan courts. It affirmed the fact that the Rwandan legal framework reflects the 
ICTR Statute, specifically article 20 governing the rights of the accused.127 However, the 
Chamber questioned on its practicability and held that the law itself is not sufficient to 
authorize referral, but other information regarding the practice is needed.128 The 
Chamber recognized that there was a lack of practice in that regard as, there was no any 
similar case transferred to Rwanda to serve as an example.129This argument seems to be 
not convincing as it is seen like to pre- judge the matter and it is based on presumption 
rather than tangible facts. 
 
With regard to the protection of defence witnesses, the Chamber rejects the 
argument that the witnesses will be at risk while testifying in proceedings in transferred 
cases. It emphasized that there were witnesses who used to testify before the ICTR and 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 See Prosecutor v Jean Baptiste Gatete Case No. ICTR 2006-61 R11 bis Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, decided on 17th November 2008. 
126 Prosecutor v Jean Baptiste Gatete at para 8. 
127 Prosecutor v Jean Baptiste Gatete at para 31. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Prosecutor v Jean Baptiste Gatete  supra at para 32. 
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back in their respective country.130So this could not be a threat to defence witnesses to 
bar the referral as the court correctly demonstrates that there is no any judicial system in 
the world that can promise witnesses absolute protection.131 
 
3.2.4. Analysis of cases 
 
The issues arising from the above discussed ‘transferral cases’, shows how 
various judges are unclear in interpreting the criteria governing referrals and their role 
while deciding referrals.  The first problem was to know whether the national legal 
framework which complies with Rule 11 bis is sufficient to guarantee the accused a fair 
trial or not. This discussion stems from the fact that the prosecutor’s opinion was that the 
court’s duty was only to determine that available laws applicable to the accused in 
Rwanda would ensure a fair trial or not.132 The Chamber disagreed with the prosecutor’s 
view by arguing that its task is to make sure that the accused will receive a fair trial by 
looking beyond legislation.133 It shows clearly that there is a paradigm between the 
ICTR judges on what tasks the court is required to perform on basis of Rule 11 bis. 
 
The above situation seems to be applied only to referrals to Rwanda but not for 
other states where these complications have never been imposed. For example, in the 
transfer of cases of Bagaragaza to the Netherland and those involving Munyeshyaka and 
Bucyibaruta to France, the Chamber was satisfied with requirements of Rule 11 bis only. 
It looked at the legal guarantees available in France and Netherland’s legislation to allow 
referrals.134This is contrary to the judge’s reasoning for cases to be referred to Rwanda, 
whereby the practice was required on top of legislation.135   
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38 
 
Secondly, on the issue of witness protection, the chamber dismissed referrals to 
Rwanda where a lot more was required to be done, while it was satisfied that they would 
be protected in other countries. 
 
3.2.5. The distribution of defendants between domestic and international 
jurisdictions 
 
The interaction and distribution of defendants between national and international 
jurisdictions continues to raise particular concern in the exercise of competing 
jurisdiction in the Rwandan context. In the ICTR context, it has produced some issues 
which need to be looked at and solved before its completion. In this section of this 
thesis, I am going to inspect two major problems relating to concurrent jurisdiction that 
may arise after ICTR closes. The first case pertains to the unreliability of courts of 
‘third- party’ states in receiving transferred cases. Secondly, I examine the problems 
related to ‘stratified-concurrent jurisdiction’ raised by Morris.136 
 
We have previously seen three situations in which the ICTR would have to 
affirm its primacy over domestic courts. One among them is the situation in which the 
national judicial system proves to be unreliable.137 After the ICTR completes its entire 
work, domestic courts of various countries will continue to exercise their jurisdiction 
over the crime of genocide as provided in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.138 Now at this stage of closing of ICTR, the key 
issue to consider is to find out what is going to occur when for example countries which 
had been reluctant to shield genocide suspects living on their soil continue to do so. One 
may wonder the future in the case the precaution measures provided by the ICTR are no 
more there. I think that this matter should have been taken into account in advance and 
provided remedy to it as it has been for other issues that occur after the closure of the 
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137 See article 8 paragraphs 2 and 9 of the ICTR Statute supra note 1.  
138 See article 1 of the Genocide Convention supra note 35. 
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court specifically those pertaining to the enforcement of sentences and review 
proceedings. I propose that the UNSC may establish a roster of ad litem judges which 
will continue to assert the primacy in such circumstances. 
 
The ICTR system of distribution of defendants has been according to Morris 
defined as a ‘stratified-concurrent jurisdiction’.139 She illustrates that it has been an 
arrangement through which the international ad hoc tribunal prosecute those who bear 
the greatest responsibility and abandon to domestic courts the rest of the accused who 
are not the leaders.140 Morris underlined the negative aspects of such a system by saying 
that this may ‘generate a divergent repercussions and potential barriers to justice’.141 
According to her, those barriers are inter alia, the ‘anomalies of inversion’ whereby the 
most responsible defendants get the lenient treatment with a least harsh treatment’.142  
She further goes onto exemplify how ‘stratified-concurrent jurisdiction’ is likely to 
cause injustices in practice just because trial in front of an international tribunal will 
have tendency to be more favourable for the accused defendants than would trial before 
domestic courts.143 
 
A good example that mirrors the situation is when an international tribunal will 
not impose the death penalty among the sentences of the tribunal while certain domestic 
courts still have the death penalty in their penal codes. Secondly, is the issue of the 
imbalance between two types of prisons where the convicted have to serve their 
sentences.  The prisons utilised by an international tribunal in which to serve sentences 
imposed by it may generally present excellent conditions than the incarceration 
conditions for the sentences handed down by domestic courts. Thirdly, it is clear that an 
international tribunal would strive to guarantee to the defendants the fair trial and avoid 
unjustified delay of process, while domestic courts especially those struggling with 
issues of resources and backlogs in their system may not assure that. Finally, the accused 
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individual in domestic courts will have more ground than the accused tried in front of  
an international tribunal to fear bias resulting from the victor`s justice or lack of 
independence and impartiality within the domestic judicial system.144 
 
As seen earlier whereby Rwanda has been refused in the first instance the 
transfer for certain trials, I believe that it should be given the opportunity to carry out the 
enforcement of sentences imposed by the ICTR to its citizens. It is of paramount 
importance to achieve national healing and reconciliation that Rwanda is looking for 
after the 1994 genocide.  This is essential towards the national reconciliation because 
justice without national reconciliation is insufficient and ineffective.145 
 
In order to achieve the national reconciliation, it is crucial that the sentences of 
the leaders convicted by the ICTR be served on the Rwandan soil. This will help to 
encourage reconciliation the country needs as between the so called ‘small fish’ 
convicted at national level and the leaders who planned and incited them to commit 
crimes. Reconciliation between perpetrators and victims respective families would also 
be encouraged.  
    
3.3.  Issues affiliated to the enforcement of ICTR`s judgements by 
national courts 
 
The transfer of cases is a consequence of ICTR closure and is done based on the 
concurrent jurisdiction between that tribunal and national Courts. From that situation, 
there are issues that may arise in the future that need to be examined. After a case is 
closed before the ICTR and has come up for a conviction, the convict who have been 
sentenced is supposed to serve the sentence in one of the countries which have an 
                                                 




agreement to that effect with the ICTR.146 In accordance with article 26 of the ICTR 
statute regulating the enforcement of sentence, it is clear that the  imprisonment imposed 
by the Court  shall be served in a country nominated  by  the international tribunal  from 
a list of States  which have  shown  to the security council  their desire  to welcome the 
convicted persons.147 
 
This section will consider the issues related to the enforcement of sentences 
imposed by the ICTR and those that may occur after the sentence have been served, 
meaning after the enforcement. 
 
3.3.1. The enforcement of sentences 
 
In connection with the enforcement of sentences whether imposed by ICTR or 
domestic courts, there are three issues which occur and justify my observation in this 
study. These problems include inequality in terms of the enforcement of sentences, the 
violation by states of the agreements signed between them and the UN and the issues 
concerning the control of enforcement of sentences by the Security Council after the 
ICTR ends its functions. 
 
3.3.1.1. Imbalance in terms sentences enforcement.  
 
Since the sentences are imposed by ICTR, they are expected to be enforced in 
various countries in agreement with the tribunal. It is obvious that the issue of inequality 
in the enforcement is very probable to take place. This situation seems to be ineluctable 
as the execution of sentences has to comply with the laws of the host country.148  Taking 
                                                 
146 See article 26 of the ICTR Statute op cit. 
147 Metraux G International crimes and the ad hoc tribunals (Oxford University Press 2006) Oxford, at 
359. 
148 See the agreement between the government of the Republic of Rwanda and the United Nations on the 
enforcement of sentences of the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda available online at 
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an example of this situation, two persons who have been convicted for similar sentences 
by ICTR; these individuals may be dispatched to different countries to serve their 
sentences. But because they are entitled to some benefit such as the parole or provisional 
early release, it may differ substantially just because of the applicable legislation of each 
country, and it may result therefore for the two individuals to serve in fact two very 
divergent sentences for the same crime.149 
 
It is worthwhile to mention that the disproportion of sentences for the reasons 
that custodial conditions will never be the same in various countries which host the 
enforcement of sentences handed down by ICTR. In my opinion, it is required that these 
remarkable gaps within the practice regarding the enforcement of sentences should be 
halved or diminished. At this point I would suggest that a common denominator 
legislation regulating enforcement of sentences should be enacted to give a solution that 
set free to this matter when it comes to an international tribunal to send the convicted 
individuals in various countries to serve their sentences. The task can be accomplished 
by the United Nations, which can arrange a working committee of expert to draft and 
include in its framework such a legal instrument in order to coordinate the practices. 
That legislation should provide among others the proportion of the punishment through 
which the commutation of sentences or provisional early release is not allowed. The 
United Nations should also establish the same conditions applicable to all convicted 
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149 Article 26 of the ICTR Statute. 
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3.3.1.2. Issues attached to the agreement on enforcement of sentences 
 
Before any country that shows interests to host the enforcement of sentences 
pronounced by ICTR, it has to enter in an agreement with the UN.150  These agreements 
have to induce to the concerned country to be dedicated and determined to comply with 
certain conditions set by the UN.   Therefore, should there be any violations of a 
provision of that agreement by the hosting; they should be subjected to sanctions or legal 
consequences attached to that breach. Till today no one knows in practice what should 
be the outcome for the state which violate the provisions set out by the UN in that 
regard. This is what led to believe that there is a loophole in the workings of UN when it 
comes to legal consequences attached to the breach of its instruments. This is what 
occurred in 2002 with the similar tribunal as that of Rwanda, in the case of Goran Jelisic 
convicted by ICTY, when Italy reduced his sentence.151  Here, the Security Council is 
advised to take necessary measures in advance to limit the ability of States to manipulate 
sentences as it is in the circumstances of any other violation of international obligation. 
 
3.3.1.3. Issues relating to the control of enforcement of sentences  
 
 The provision regulating the enforcement of sentences handed down by ICTR 
stipulates that ‘imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any of the states on a list of 
states which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept convicted 
persons, as designated by the International Tribunal for Rwanda’.152 The same provision 
indicates that such imprisonment shall be executed pursuing the legislation of the state 
                                                 
150 See article 26 of the ICTR Statute. 
151 See the case of Goran Jelisic who had been convicted and sentenced by the ICTY to 40 years of 
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concerned as highlighted above. This is done while preserving the important role to be 
played by the ICTR in enforcing sentences.153 
 
Regarding the pardon and commutation of sentences, Article 27 of the ICTR 
Statutes stipulates that according to the applicable law of the hosting country, the 
incarcerated person is entitled to apply for pardon or commutation of sentence by 
another sentence. This provision reaffirms that the state in question is obliged to inform 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda accordingly. It is further highlighted that the 
pardon or commutation of a sentence by another sentence is granted only after the 
President of the ICTR has exchanged the views with the judges of the Court and decided 
that the grant is in the interests of justice and the general principles of law.154  
 
Thus, from the wording of these provisions, it can be seen that the closure of the 
ICTR is going to generate a legal vacuum specifically regarding the legal issues 
pertaining to the enforcement of sentences. Ordinarily these are the issues for which the 
ICTR used to serve as a source of information or a model for domestic enforcement 
agencies.  Although the resolution establishing the completion mechanism has suggested 
a solution to those issues; it seems that in practice the remedies proposed to that problem 
are still inefficient and legally flawed. The decision that has been taken in regard to this 
matter is that after the permanent closure of ICTR, the supervising role pertaining to the 
enforcement of sentences  as provided by the  ICTR statute (articles 26 -27)  shall be 
conducted by Security Council.155  
 
Nevertheless it gives impression that this type of strategy is difficult in practice 
since it takes time based on how demanding it is to call a meeting of the Security 
                                                 
153 Ibid. 
154 See Article 27 of the ICTR Statute supra note 1. 
155 See the RPE of the ICTR supra note 54. Its Rule 104 states that: ‘All Sentences of imprisonment shall 
be served under the supervision of the tribunal or a body designated by it’. The designated body here 
seems to be the UNSC as the agreement in terms of sentences enforcement is signed by the UNSC as a 
body of UN but through the tribunal. This makes us to conclude that after the tribunal closes its doors the 
supervision will remain in the hands of UNSC.  
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Council.  Looking at how the meetings of the UNSC are convened, it appears that even 
in its regular meetings require a long and complex process to seize the council.156 This 
process requires first the communication to all member States of the UNSC and organs 
of the United Nations and of course necessitates that the agenda be adopted by way of 
voting.157 In view of the above and the workload on the table of UNSC, it seems that 
Security Council members are presumably to attribute a very minimal interest to 
meetings whose a list of items to be discussed relates to the matter of deciding on pardon 
or commutation of sentence of an individual or simply not vote for the matter brought to 
their attention. Another challenge is that, normally the process of deciding on pardon or 
commutation of sentences is a judicial process; it is a wonder how the UNSC will have 
the power to take decision on such matter as it is not a judicial body. Technically it is 
another flaw in the procedure. 
 
In my understanding, the approach taken by the UNSC concerning the ICTR was 
not suitable in this issue. I would rather suggest that this task should be given to the 
hosting states which have signed the enforcement of sentences of the ICTR with the UN. 
These countries need to be given entire emancipation to conduct the enforcement of the 
sentences and the power to commute them after the Court complete permanently its 
activities. On top of that, the Security Council must elaborate safeguards or restrictions 
through which the concerned countries would not surpass. Depending to these 
restrictions, the Security Council’s function would be also discharged instead of being 
convened on whatever occasions there a sole case involving pardon or commutation of 
sentences to resolve. 
 
                                                 
156 See the provisional rules of procedures of the security council of the United Nations available online at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/rules/chapter2.shtml [Accessed on 27/11/2013]. If one analyses these 
provisional rules of procedures of the Security Council, chapter one regulating the meetings articles 1 to 5 
and chapter two regulating the agenda articles 6 to 12, it shows how each adoption of agenda must be 
communicated to all states members and organs of the United Nations before their adoption. This long 
process may hamper the judicial process in the case the adoption is not reached by the UNSC. 
157 See article 9 of the provisional rules of procedures of the UNSC. 
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 Such restrictions should describe the circumstances under which a convicted 
person cannot be subjected to pardon or the commutation of sentences and dictate the 
minimum of sentences under which the commutation cannot be applicable.  On top of 
these limitations, the countries should be given a leeway to apply their respective laws in 
this regard as it is the situations where cases are tried in their own courts. This will be 
less undermining to the sovereignty of states in a such a way that domestic authorities 
will perform that task without  restrictions for the issues they have voluntarily endorsed.   
 
 
3.3.2. Issues arising after the enforcement: the review procedures. 
 
Among other issues stemming from the situation of concurrent jurisdiction of 
ICTR and national courts is the issue of review procedure. It is among things subjected 
to the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations after the completion of the 
ICTR. The principles of criminal law determine that the criminal decisions that are not 
subjected to appeal and other review procedures are presumed to represent the 
expression of the judicial truth. The international principle of ‘res judicata pro veritate 
habetur’ whose purpose and legal certainty is the essence that expresses this 
presumption.158 This principle entails that after all judicial remedy, a judgement 
rendered by a tribunal is considered as the law itself.  However, it may be that a decision 
has the force of ‘res judicata’ is vitiated by an error of fact or law, when all avenues of 
appeal have been exhausted. Then revision can be defined as an extraordinary remedy 
for challenging criminal judgments that are definitive in principle. Its objective is to 
cancel a decision that has been reputed final. Review therefore bears a direct attack on 
the authority of the case decided.159 It aims to correct a miscarriage of justice which 
would be unfair to maintain.160 The court may have erred in acquitting a guilty or in 
condemning an innocent individual. Applying this process to the current situation 
                                                 
158 Theofanis R ‘The doctrine of Res Judicata in International Criminal Law’ International Criminal Law 
Review, volume 3, (2003) at 196. 




whereby the ICTR is closing and forecast on how this process will be in the future, I 
think that there will be a negative aspect in practice.  
 
As mentioned earlier for the procedures relating to commutation of sentences and 
pardon, the consequences seem to be shared and dangerous for the review procedure. 
This is evidenced by the working of Security Council of the United Nations itself. It 
appears to be an impediment to the delivery of justice without undue delays because of 
its system of making decision sometimes known as to go slower and more rigid with the 
possibility of blockage for reasons of the veto system.161 Furthermore, the workings 
within the Security Council are known to be motivated by political reasons which can 
constitute an obstacle to the course of process.  Another justification could be that the 
application for review is open to the Court which issued the contested decision and none 
the other.162  With all these reasons I wonder how the action of review will be lodged, 
examined and decided as long as the tribunal that decided the initial case has closed. 
Lastly, it is clear that the significant delay in this procedure may arise at any moment in 
the future because of the reasons highlighted above.  By way of solution, I argue that 
this kind of privilege accorded to the Security Council to approve review proceeding 
should be circumvented and be given to the judicial body. This will avoid damages 
resulting from delays for the benefit of the convicted person who may be innocent. 
 
3.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter sought to analyse the legal issues arising from the competing 
jurisdiction between ICTR and national Courts in the context of Rwandan genocide. It 
has focused on the aspects respecting the Rwandan situation and other countries where 
suspects can be tried and serve their sentences. Concerning those issues, proper attention 
has been paid to the prosecution of transferred cases in Rwanda and other countries as 
                                                 
161 See article 9 of the provisional rules of procedures of the UNSC. See also Fasulo L, An insider `s guide 
to the United Nations, 2nd Edition, February (2004) at 156. 
162See article 25 and 26 of the ICTR Statute. 
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well. It shows that there is a noteworthy contradiction with regard to cases to be referred 
to Rwanda vis à vis to those referred to other countries. Regarding the ‘post closure 
issues’, its findings indicate that the issues of enforcement of sentences imposed by 
ICTR require reconsideration by the UNSC because of the imperfections within the 
Security Council functioning when it comes to adopt a resolution. It shows that the 
process is undemocratic and it may lead to the prevention of adoption of the council 
resolution. Preferably, the chapter finds that the task ahead after ICTR completion 





CHAPTER 4: LEGAL ISSUES INTRINSINC TO THE RWANDAN 
NATIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
4.1. Introduction 
Looking at the particularity of the criminal justice system of Rwanda in regard to 
the prosecution of the crime of genocide, a few crucial issues arise. This is due to the 
dualistic nature of national jurisdiction in regard to hearing of genocide matters in 
Rwanda, whereby there is the existence of conventional courts together with Gacaca 
courts, both of which deal with the crime of genocide.  
 
Two types of issues will be examined in this chapter. The first are issues related 
to the intrinsic structure of Gacaca courts and the second are those associated with the 
relationship between Gacaca courts and conventional courts. It is important to recall that 
Gacaca courts closed their doors in 2012 but most of the cases they decided on are 
recurring in formal courts. These cases are often brought by the defendants who were 
not happy with the judgements rendered by Gacaca courts and opt to apply for review of 
judgements.  Before I go any further, it is worthwhile to provide a brief overview of the 
Rwandan judicial system. 
4.2.  A Brief Overview of the Rwandan judicial system 
 
Rwanda has two forms of justice. 163  This system comprised of conventional 
courts and Gacaca courts.164  For the purpose of this dissertation the concept 
‘conventional’ or ‘formal’ courts points to those courts established on the basis of 
conventional procedural rules imposed by human rights standards and known as a 
component of the judiciary system. In contrast, Gacaca courts are ‘a combination of a 
                                                 
163 This overview has been made from the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Rwanda of 04/06/2003 as amended to date, the Organic Law No 01/2004 of 29/01/2004 on the 
organization, functioning and competence of the Supreme Court and the Organic Law No 51/2008 of 
9/9/2008 on the organization, functioning and competence of courts. 
164 See chapter 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 04/06/2003 as amended to date.  
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retributive and restorative justice system’ 165 and not considered on the organization 
chart of the judiciary but under the executive arm of government.   
Gacaca courts constitute part of the community justice system established in 
2001. The judiciary of Rwanda encompass also military courts and commercial courts as 
classified within ‘formal Courts’. 166 Thus, the formal courts of the Rwandan judiciary 
encompass ‘ordinary’ courts and tribunals competent to try civilians and military courts 
competent to try offences committed by military personnel and their civilian 
accomplices. It is important to note that the military courts are exclusively competent in 
criminal matters only while ordinary courts are competent for both civil and criminal 
cases. In the situation whereby the criminal conducts are committed by civilians without 
the military accomplices, they are entitled to be held responsible by common courts. The 
general overview of Rwandan courts is being described below for a better understanding 
of the Rwandan judiciary structure. 
 
Both the Rwandan Constitution and the organic law determine the organization, 
functions and jurisdiction of courts and prescribe the classification of courts in 
Rwanda.167 Their provisions stipulate that there are established ordinary and specialized 
courts. The first category of ordinary courts includes the Supreme Court which is the 
highest Court in the country, the High Court, Intermediate Courts and Primary Courts. 
The second category consists of specialized courts, such as Gacaca courts under the 
executive power organically, Military Courts, Commercial Courts and others that may 




                                                 
165 Jennifer op cit at 3. 
166 In Rwanda there are two military courts: the Military Tribunal (first instance) and Military High Court 
(Appeal Court). 
167  See article 143 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda op cit. See also article 2 of the organic 




4.3.  Issues related to Gacaca courts structure. 
 
This part of the dissertation will focus on the rationale behind the creation of 
Gacaca courts, their objectives, their functioning in practice and the assessment.  
 
4.3.1.  Rationale for establishing Gacaca Court 
 
After the genocide in 1994, trials to bring offenders to book at national and 
international level were conducted. All these trials were unsuccessful in dealing 
efficiently with the enormous number of suspects that were waiting to face justice.169 
After the genocide from the year 1995 to 2000 the specialised chambers that were 
created within the formal courts of Rwanda prosecuted only six thousand accused for 
genocide out of 120 000 incarcerated suspects.170  At this speed, it was realised that the 
process would take many years to prosecute all genocide cases. This concern which was 
becoming more crucial led to the creation of Gacaca mechanism.171 It must be noted that 
many suspects who were at large that time were later on arrested and tried. At the time 
of closure Gacaca courts had tried about 2 000 000 people.172 Gacaca courts were set up 
as a way of dealing with the issue of backlog of genocide trials but also to serve as the 
best way to achieve reconciliation because it was designed after the model of Rwandan 
traditional system of conflict resolution.  During the set-up of Gacaca courts, the main 
objectives were assigned to that system. These objectives aimed to: 
i. establish the truth on genocide and eradicate the culture of impunity; 
ii. to accelerate the genocide trials which involved a high number of 
suspects; 
                                                 
169 Constitution of Rwanda. 
170  Cecile Aptel op cit at 329. 
171 Ibid. 
172 See the interview of BBC with Rwandan government officials available online at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18490348. They said that about two million people went through 
the process of Gacaca. 
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iii. to unite and reconcile Rwandans after the atrocities by involving them in 
solving their own problems. 
 
4.3.1.1. Initiate the truth on genocide 
 
The establishment of the Gacaca courts has served as a best opportunity to 
achieve the truth about what happened in genocide.  The law number 40/2000 of 
26/01/2001 establishing these courts, stipulated that ‘[c]considering that such offences 
were publicly committed before the eyes of the population, which thus must recount the 
facts, disclose the truth...’173 This law requires ordinary citizens to participate and tell the 
truth about who organized, perpetrated the crimes and how they were capable to do so. 
This process of telling the truth helps to prevent the recurrence of future atrocities.174 
 
4.3.1.2. Suppression of a culture of impunity 
 
For a long time, from the time of independence to the period of the 1994 Tutsi 
genocide, the country was characterized by recurrent ethnic violence. There were 
numerous killings in the years 1959, 1962, 1973 and in the 1990 which all led to the 
1994 genocide. Most of these atrocities went unpunished, as none of the perpetrators 
were ever been punished for their deeds but they were granted amnesty. This illustrates 
how perpetrators of atrocities were exempted from punishment for a long time in the 
Rwandan society that even during the 1994 genocide nobody was being held liable for 
his conducts. Removing that culture of impunity was one of the Gacaca objectives. 
 
 
                                                 
173 See the preamble of the Law No 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up Gacaca jurisdictions and organizing 
prosecution for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed 
between October, 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994. 




4.3.1.3. Hasten the genocide trials 
 
 One of the key aims of establishing these courts was to accelerate the 
proceedings of genocide trials. With the intention to address the issue of backlog  of 
cases and avoiding to fall in the ‘justice delayed, justice denied’ trap, a large number of 
Gacaca courts were created  all over the country as an easy way to deal with many cases 
in a reasonable time. It is in that regard that law number 16/2004 of 19/06/2004 put in 
place an overall number of 12 103 courts among whom 9 013 were Gacaca courts of 




4.3.1.4. Unity and reconciliation of Rwandans 
 
Gacaca as a type of restorative justice which strives to achieve reconciliation 
requires healing, justice, truth and reparation of harm.176 With these courts, it might be 
said that all these goals are possible. For the three last goals, it is very easy to draw 
directly from the functioning of Gacaca courts, but for unity and reconciliation, it is 
required to describe how these Courts contributed to the healing of the Rwandan 
community. Gacaca Courts have presented an advantage for both the victims and the 
accused person. For the victims, Gacaca process has enabled them to be aware where the 
remains of their relatives were thrown and be given a chance to bury them with great 
respect. The system of ‘guilty plea’ has contributed somehow to the mental healing of 
the victims. Regarding the accused persons who plead guilty, they were granted 
considerable reduction of sentence. In that way the accused is then discharged from 
shame and self-accusation just because he feel he has redressed his offence through the 
                                                 
175 See the law No 16/2004 of 19/06/2004 establishing the organization, competence and functioning of 
Gacaca courts, in J.O, No Special of 19/06 2004. 
176 See ‘Reconciliation after violent conflict’ chap. 2, 3 and ‘Truth, justice and reparations: challenges for 




punishment imposed and that he was not subjected to the severe penalty that he 
deserved.  
 
4.3.1.5. Promote the population in solving their own problem 
 
The fact that the atrocities committed in Rwanda, have been perpetrated at the 
eyesight of the entire international community without any intervention, taught the 
Rwandans a lesson. They were saddened that they were abandoned by the international 
community during the genocide. To find their own way of resolving problems, 
Rwandans established Gacaca as a system through which they wanted to avoid waiting 
for the same international community to find solutions for the problems caused by 
genocide. 
4.4.  Gacaca Courts functioning in practice. 
 
 Gacaca Courts systems were operating throughout the entire territory of Rwanda 
in various localities. The system operated at three levels: at the cell level, at the sector 
level and the court of Appeal. These courts are presided over by judges called 
Inyangamugayo.177 These are the laymen chosen among the population of Rwanda on 
the consideration of their reputation as reliable and trustworthy persons.  
Gacaca sessions were conducted in public and it was a civic obligation for every 
citizen to participate in proceedings. In this regard, each citizen had the right to involve 
oneself by posing questions, charging or defending the accused person. It is important to 
note that the accused was not assisted by a defence counsel.  
 
                                                 




The system of Gacaca was based on the defendant’s classification and plea 
agreement arrangement.178 The category of accused corresponded with the competence 
of the courts whereby persons set in the first category were tried by the formal courts, 
while lesser categories were tried by the Gacaca courts. In a categorization, if a person 
placed in the category of a civilian he/she will be prosecuted before ordinary Courts and 
by military tribunals if he/she was a soldier at any rank level.  
 
4.5. The relationship between Gacaca courts and conventional 
courts in Rwanda. 
 
The connection between the Gacaca courts and national formal courts has been 
divided in two ways. The relationship in regard of transfers of cases from Gacaca to 
formal courts and conversely. 
 
 
4.5.1.1.  Cases from Gacaca courts to formal courts: categorization.  
 
The classification of genocide suspects was done depending on the level of 
culpability and the position the suspect occupied at the time of atrocities. At the 
beginning of the Gacaca process, suspects were classified into four categories. Later on 
they were reduced to three.  
 
According to the Organic Law no 08/96 of 30/08/1996, the primary category 
included leaders, planners and organizers of the genocide and perpetrators of heinous 
murder or sexual torture.179 Category two encompassed all perpetrators who committed 
homicides, while perpetrators of grave assaults against the person not emanating in death 
                                                 
178 See the law establishing Gacaca courts op cit. 
179 Article 2 of the Organic Law No 08/96 of 30/08/1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences 
constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990 in JO 
No17 of 1/9/1996. 
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were in category three. And perpetrators who committed property crimes such as 
pillaging and others in relation with genocide were arranged in category four.180  
 
Afterwards, categories two and three were combined and because of consecutive 
legislations on Gacaca which follows, the content and classification of categories was 
reviewed.  In the assessment of categories, certain acts were moved from one category to 
another and acts which were not defined by foregoing legislations were instituted and 
classified. An example is a case that involved dehumanising acts on dead bodies which 
was in category one under the Organic Law No 16/2004 of 19/06/2004.181  
It is clear that from various amendments of laws which occurred at the time 
proceedings were on-going, certain cases were moved from Gacaca to formal Courts. 
This resulted from the mistakes initially made in categorization of suspects in the wrong 
category, through which new information discovered revealed that the case deserved to 
be transferred from Gacaca to formal courts. 
 
 
4.5.1.2. Cases from formal national courts to Gacaca courts. 
 
At the time Gacaca courts were completing all the cases falling in their 
competence, they also assumed control over the cases that were outstanding in formal 
Courts. All these cases that remained unsettled within formal courts by 19 May 2008 
were transferred over to Gacaca courts.  
 
Among the cases transferred from formal courts to Gacaca, is the case of Major 
General Laurent Munyakazi 182 transferred from Supreme Court. This case is worthwhile 
                                                 
180 Ibid. 
181 See article 5 of Organic Law No16/2004 op cit.  
182 The case file No RP/Gén/0002/05; TM/Gén/0002/05; RPA/Gén/0001/07/HCM and 
RPAA/Gén/0008/07/CS, case which proceedings started in War Council, Military Tribunal, Military High 
Court, Supreme Court and closed finally in Gacaca courts. 
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mentioning because its proceedings has been circulated in various formal courts such as 
Military Court, the Supreme Court and finally ended up in a Gacaca Court. 
 
This case was initially opened by the general military prosecution in 1997 under 
a military court case No RP/Gén/0002/05/TM.  The case was decided on 16/11/2006 and 
Munyakazi was charged and convicted him with life imprisonment. Both the accused 
and the prosecution were not satisfied with the judgement and appealed to the Military 
High Court on 24/11/2006 and 29/11/2006 respectively and the judgement of Military 
High Court was passed on 27/04/2007 and confirmed the impugned decision. On 
03/05/2007 the accused exercised his last right of appeal to the Supreme Court (Case no. 
RPAA/Gén/0008/07/CS), but on 11/02/2008 the court decided that the appeal would not 
be accepted because of its lack of competence to try the case.183 The Supreme Court 
declared itself incompetent on the grounds that the accused was not in category one as a 
person who was among planners and organisers of genocide neither a person who was at 
national leadership level.184. Thus, it decided that the case be transmitted to Gacaca court 
of Rugenge Sector in Kigali City on 10/10/2009. The accused was convicted by Gacaca 
court to life imprisonment with perpetual confinement on 23/10/2009.  
 
The case delayed in formal Courts and it took almost ten years but since it was 
transferred in Gacaca by Supreme Court, it has been tried and closed in only ten days. 
This delay is due basically to the judicial reform of 2004 which has resulted in numerous 
postponements of hearings just because there was unavailability of defence lawyers. 
This illustrates how various human rights of the accused may obstruct each other. In the 
situation of Rwanda, the right to be assisted by a defence lawyer may in some 
circumstances become an impediment to the right to be judged in a reasonable time. In 
                                                 
183 See Prosecutor v Major General Laurent Munyakazi, case No RPAA 0008/Gén/07/CS of 17 May 2009 
at paras 30-36. 
184 See  articles 1 and 9 of the organic law Nº 13/2008 of 19/05/2007 modifying and complementing 
Organic Law n°16/2004 of 19/6/2004 establishing the organization, competence and functioning of 
Gacaca Courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other 
crimes against humanity, committed between 1 October  1990 and 31 December  1994 as modified and 
complemented to date 
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this situation, whereby there are two conflicting rights, it is necessary to estimate and 
consider which of both rights is more important.  
 
4.6. Assessment of Gacaca system. 
 
Before going further with review of specific criticisms towards Gacaca system, it 
is first and foremost to make my general assessment of the system drawn from the 
practice. There are certain aspects of its features which are likely to result in a violation 
of human rights.  For example, cases where the accused does not merit being in the first 
category but is put in that category by mistake, the consequences to the accused were to 
lost the right to the reduction of punishment connected to the guilty plea.185 
 
The fact that the legislation regulating Gacaca courts has been amended on 
numerous occasions with the purpose to improve its workings, one can say that it may 
be an origin of human rights violations for some people pertaining to inequality of 
treatment amongst the accused persons. This is due to six various laws which have been 
applied to Gacaca Courts from the beginning to the date of their closure.186  
 
Every amendment of the previous law was made with the intention to improve 
the loopholes discovered through the implementation of that law in practice. When the 
new legislation came into force, certain cases were already decided and that new law 
could not apply to them. In general, the result of the new law was good but it created 
disadvantages at the individual level because some people suffered under the previous 
law.  
                                                 
185  According to the article 56 of the Organic Law No 40/2000  of 26/01/2001 setting up gacaca 
jurisdictions  and organizing  prosecutions  for offences  constituting the crime of genocide or crimes 
against humanity committed between  October1,1990 and December 31,1994, the persons whose criminal 
acts or criminal participation place in the first category do not enjoy penalty commutation. 
186  See the Organic Law No 08/96 of  30/08/1996 ; Organic  Law No 40/2000 of  26/01/2001; Organic  
Law No 16/2004 of  19/06/2004; Organic  Law No 10/2007 of  01/03/2007 and the Organic  Law No  





Besides these considerations, three main criticisms have been generally put 
forward against Gacaca courts: 
i. the fact that the accused persons do not have a defence counsel;  
ii. the judges who are laymen and  
iii. the lack of independence of Gacaca courts. 
 
4.7.  Shortcomings of Gacaca Courts 
 
4.7.1. Right to be assisted by a defence counsel 
 
 As highlighted earlier in this dissertation the right to defence counsel in the 
circumstances of genocide cases tried by Gacaca Courts appears to be disproportionate 
with the right to be tried within a reasonable time. According to the principle of equality 
before the law, all the accused persons should enjoy the right of defence. Thus, this right 
should not be examined at the individual level.  In the context of Rwanda, considering 
the proportion between the number of defence lawyers and the accused persons awaiting 
the trial in need to be assisted, it was impossible to provide that right to all the accused. 
That is why the government opted to balance between this right and the right to be tried 
in a reasonable time as a solution.  
 
In acting in the same way, the right to be tried in a reasonable time appears to 
prevail. To be able to know if making the balance between the two rights is allowed; 
scholars like Clayton and Tomlinson concludes that the right to defence counsel is not 
absolute. They argue that the right of everyone under Article 6(3) (c) of the European 
convention on Human Rights to be effectively defended by a lawyer ... is one of the 
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fundamental features of a fair trial.’187 The problem is that this provision does not 
provide an absolute right for an accused person to choose between obtaining a legal 
counsel and defending oneself but it does prohibit a state from forcing a person to 
defend himself in person.188In this case of the Gacaca process it cannot be said that the 
government of Rwanda has forced the accused persons to defend themselves. It would 
have been the case only if there was another alternative for them to obtain defence 
counsel. Thus that alternative was not present to say that they were denied their right. 
 
4.7.2. Gacaca courts independence and impartiality 
 
Among the precondition to a sound justice system the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial court must be considered. It is so essential that the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) has recognized it as a ‘universal right that may suffer no 
exception’.189 This right to be adjudicated by an impartial court signifies that judges 
assigned to that case should have no interest in that case and do not have pre-determined 
opinions.190 According to the HRC, impartiality implies that ‘judges must not harbour 
preconceptions about the matter put before them, and that they must not act in ways that 
promote the interests of one of the parties to the case.’191    
 
Among the criticisms against Gacaca courts, is the allegation that these courts 
were less independent than other Courts. This is said in light of the background and 
status of the inyangamugayo. Since the presiding officer is a layman it is argued that 
                                                 
187 Clayton R and Tomlinson H The law of human rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2000) at 
666.See also  Pakelli v Germany (1983) 6 EHRR 1. 
188 Ibid. 
189 González del Río v Peru Communication No. 263/1987, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987 (1992) at 
para 20. 
190Amnesty International Fair Trial Manual available at   
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/fairtrial/indxftm_a.htm#1 [Accessed on 29/1/2014]. 
 
191Karttunen v Finland, (387/1989), 23 October 1992, Report of the HRC, vol.II, (A/48/40), 1993, at 120, 
para 7.2 as quoted in Amnesty International Fair trial Rights Manual:   
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/fairtrial/indxftm_a.htm#1 [Accessed 29/01/2014]. 
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they are unprofessional which leads these courts to be more easily subjected to pressure 
than other courts.192 
 
 I disagree with this position because as the trials were conducted publicly, these 
unprofessional judges were on permanent public inspection and monitoring which could 
be a safeguard. But I don’t deny that it can happen that some inyangamugayo go awry 
however this may occur in any other court as to err is human. It has been decided that 
‘independence refers to independence of the executive power and also towards litigants 
parties’.193 That is why in determining whether a tribunal can be considered to be 
independent; proper attention should be paid to factors such as ‘the manner of 
appointment of members, their term of office and the presence of guarantees against 
outside pressures’.194 In this regard, they have been many hesitations about Gacaca 
independence because organically, it is placed under the executive power. However, 
such a perception of independence appropriate to classic concept of separation of powers 
cannot be applicable to Gacaca. This is because the courts have been labelled as a 
popular justice where members of the three powers work hand in hand as belonging to a 
common power.  
 
4.7.3. Unprofessional judges. 
 
Concerning the objections towards the lack of professionalism of Gacaca judges, 
I do not believe that this is a matter of serious concern. There may be isolated cases 
whereby a problem might be found; however in most cases there were enough 
safeguards as the sessions were conducted publically and every participant has the right 
to rectify anything going wrong. It is important to emphasize that in a popular justice 
system as it is with the case of Gacaca, the population acts at the same time as judges, 
                                                 
192 Cecile Aptel, op cit at 331. 
193 Ringeisen v Austria  (No1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455 para 95. 
194 Bryan v United kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 342 para 37 noted (1996) EHRLR 184. 
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prosecutors and defence counsels.195  Thus, the pressure from outside or any kind of 
influence which could have happened was dealt and detected easily by the public. 
 
4.8. Analysis of issues arising from the relationship between 
Gacaca courts and formal courts 
 
As both Courts were handling the same cases on the basis of concurrent 
jurisdiction, there was no a remedy established in case of conflicts of jurisdiction that 
may arises between the two courts. The lack of that clarity of which court’s decision 
which might prevail as between ordinary courts and Gacaca Courts created problems in 
cases decided by Gacaca. The law terminating Gacaca does not provided a viable 
solution to the pending cases that were under Gacaca jurisdiction and others which may 
rise after. This includes for example cases subjected to appeal and review proceedings. 
The law in question stipulates that only cases tried in absentia will qualify for review 
and appeal. This provision is not based on any legal consideration and violates the rights 
of certain litigants such as rights to appeal and review of trial, both alternatives set forth 
in Rwandan legislation. Thus, based on the principles enshrined in Rwandan legislation, 
the opportunity to appeal or review should be given to all instead of those tried in 
absentia only. 
 
4.9.   Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with a description of Gacaca Courts and how they operated in 
practice. This was a particular form of dispute resolution system established after the 
genocide. The aim was to expedite genocide cases due to the high volume of genocide 
trial backlogs. The chapter has shown how these courts have operated parallel to 
ordinary courts over the crime of genocide on the basis of concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, 
                                                 
195 Clark Phil op cit at 132. 
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the peculiarity of the Rwandan situation and its judicial system in respect of the 
genocide trials raised difficult issues. These include, inter alia, the question of 
increasing of application for review of genocide trials tried by Gacaca in ordinary courts, 
a fact that cases are far from being closed. This is caused by the fact that the law 
terminating Gacaca courts seems to give limited factors through which a case decided by 
Gacaca Courts may be subjected for review under pretext of preventing massive trial 
recurrence. These rights have been accorded to those convicted in absentia instead of 
being given to all litigants without discrimination. The chapter also dealt with the issues 
arising from laws on Gacaca, especially the way the categorization was made, in 
practice; it has been observed an inequality based on treatment among people placed in 
various categories. Finally, a thorough analysis was conducted to demonstrate that 
despite the work accomplished by these Courts, the exit mechanism to deal with post 
closure is not accurate enough to find an effective solution. It applies to certain cases 
and left out others which violates the rights recognized by national legislations of 
Rwanda and international human rights instruments as well. Consequently, the 
government must give a leeway to all potential litigants who wish to continue exercise 




CHAPTER 5:   GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
5.1. General summary 
 
This dissertation has sought to the debate issues surrounding the application of 
competing jurisdiction. The study concentrated on the principle of concurrent domestic 
and international jurisdiction as applied in Rwanda. The paper has shown that the 
application of the principle includes two legal structures. One at domestic level and 
another at the international level, both interacting through specific relationships. The 
relationship between the national and international jurisdiction on one hand and among 
national jurisdictions on the other hand has some inherent problems whose shape varies 
with a particular context. In the context of my study, two problems seemed to be more 
relevant to deserve my analysis: the distribution of defendants among national and 
international jurisdictions and the transfer of suspects from the ICTR to domestic 
jurisdictions. About the transfer of the accused persons from the ICTR, I saw challenges 
in cases to be transferred to Rwanda. My view was that transfer to Rwanda should be 
allowed to the fullest as it has made considerable efforts to comply with requirements.  
At this aspect I also realized that third countries where fugitives are hidden or arrested 
are, as general tendency, not willing in trying suspects living on their soil. I suggest at 
the same time that the UN should manage to produce encouragement to countries to 
abandon their passivity. 
 
This research has been conducted at the time when the ICTR is about to close. I 
endeavoured to anticipate this forthcoming event in the context of my study. Special 
attention was paid to the loophole left by the ICTR specifically with respect to its 
supervision role on the enforcement of sentence, the grant of pardon and commutation of 
sentence and the review proceedings by domestic enforcement agencies. That role will 
be taken over by the UNSC but I suggest that the way it is expected to play the role be 
reassessed.  I recommended that in place of being mixed up in every single case, the 
UNSC should elaborate the guidelines serving as restrictions, reference and standards 
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for countries concerned. Furthermore, beyond these restrictions each country concerned 
should be free to exert its judicial sovereignty in conformity with its legislations.  
 
This dissertation has also covered the process of dealing with genocide cases by 
Rwandan courts. I analysed the impact of the split of formal courts and Gacaca courts. 
Being established as a way to exit from the problem of backlog when formal courts 
disclosed the inability to provide solution, Gacaca courts served as a mixed character as 
restorative and retributive justice.  In a situation with this nature, it is obviously 
difficult to avoid any human rights violations. As Morris identified, when it comes to 
design legal responses in such complex situations surrounding crimes of mass violence 
she wondered ‘what action will do the most good and the least harm under the 
circumstances’.196  I analysed various human rights issues inherent to the nature of 
Gacaca courts especially those that were unavoidable in the Gacaca process. As Gacaca 
courts already closed, it is a necessity that some residual issues among whom human 
rights issues be taken over by the formal Courts. Those issues are inter alia the cases of 
people who have been convicted in absentia by Gacaca Courts, the review proceedings 
in case of miscarriage of justice made by Gacaca Courts and the issue of compensation 




Before closing this study, it would be important to propose the following 
recommendation towards the government of Rwanda and the United Nations in order to 
address the issues left out by the closure of Gacaca and the ICTR.  
As it is the responsibility of the Government, for the interests of national 
reconciliation and healing, it is required to provide compensation to the victims of such 
                                                 
196 Morris op cit at 361. 
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violations. It should ensure that those who have been hurt the most be compensated and 
establish the appropriate way that compensation should be accomplished. 
 
The government should study carefully the residual issues left by Gacaca Courts 
and provide for their solution. This implies for example for the government to put in 
place a law relating to compensation for damage resulting from Gacaca process and 
miscarriage of justice. Such compensation should be on the charge of the State or in case 
of bad faith; the charge will be on the officer responsible of the damage as it is now.  
 
The performance of a thorough study to identify all possible residual issues to 
rise after the ICTR completion is really required. Finally, the Rwandan government may 
continue to persuade the UNSC to order the enforcement of decisions against people 
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